Temper Tantrums

The differences between the U.S. and its South Vietnamese allies over the glacial progress of the Paris peace talks have never been very far from the surface. Last week they burst into full public view in a transatlantic quarrel between U.S. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford and South Viet Nam's Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky.

Clifford has made no secret of his annoyance with the Saigon regime for its stalling on the peace talks. Last week the conference was still deadlocked over the shape of the conference table to be provided for the parties--the U.S., South Viet Nam, North Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front, political arm of the Viet Cong. Clifford erupted on TV: "I am becoming inordinately impatient with the continued deaths of American boys in Viet Nam. I would like to get going at the Paris conference."

Tinhorn Dictator? Clifford's rebuke privately pleased U.S. Negotiator Averell Harriman, who agreed that the brick-walling over procedures has gone on long enough. Still, Harriman took pains to try to soothe Ky, went so far as to spend at one point 75 minutes conferring with him.

Ky was hardly mollified. The Secretary of Defense, he declared, had "shown a gift of saying the wrong thing at the wrong time." At a reception in his honor, Ky went farther. "Do you ever hear the Russians or the Chinese criticizing North Viet Nam?" he fumed. "My problem is I have to fight not only my enemies but also my so-called friends. Those who talk are not especially my friends. They sometimes talk too much. They think that by insulting me they will make me change my mind. They make a mistake. I would like them to shut up."

What further irritated Ky was the fact that Clifford's attack emboldened South Dakota's Senator George McGovern to weigh in with an intemperate comment. He called Ky a "tinhorn dictator" (Ky's defenders pointed out that he was no more of a dictator than more recent Vietnamese rulers, and that, at any rate, President Nguyen Van Thieu has all but eclipsed him) and added: "While Ky is playing around in the plush spots of Paris and haggling over whether he is going to sit at a round table or a rectangular table, American men are dying to prop up his corrupt regime." Ky's Special Assistant, Dang Huc Khoi, said that the Vice President had no intention of "joining Mr. McGovern in the gutter," but he did note that Ky had been out only once before the reception--to dine with Ambassador Harriman--and that he occupies a house with 36 other people.

Amidst the exchange of insults, Vance and his North Vietnamese counterpart, Colonel Ha Van Lau, met but got nowhere on the issue of a conference table. Hanoi, in fact, has rivaled Saigon in its fussing over the point. For both, the seemingly puerile bickering about furniture represents a vital issue of sovereignty. The Communists are determined to bring the N.L.F. to the table as an equal; Saigon just as adamantly refuses.

Three Sets of Tables. For the U.S., the squabbling over procedures raised yet another problem: how to prevent the Communists from deliberately prolonging the Paris talks in order to aggravate political division between the allies. One possible solution was proposed last week by Henry A. Kissinger, President-elect Nixon's choice as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In an article for the January Foreign Affairs written before his appointment, Kissinger suggests that three sets of talks could be convened: 1) the U.S. and Hanoi meeting alone to work out the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Viet Nam; 2) the Viet Cong sitting down with Saigon to negotiate the South's political future, and 3) an international group to discuss guarantees of peace once the troop withdrawal took place.

Kissinger's proposal that the U.S. and Hanoi work out details of a mutual troop pullback by themselves closely parallels Clifford's own ideas. It is the Defense Secretary's thesis that as long as the U.S. remains heavily involved in South Viet Nam and the "golden stream" of American dollars keeps flowing, Saigon does not feel compelled to work toward a political compromise (see box, page 11). Thus, Clifford reasons, the U.S. must make it absolutely clear to South Viet Nam that its commitment is not open-ended.

Bulldozer Ransom. The U.S. also took pains to put the Communists on notice against double-dealing. Ominous signs of enemy troop movements--perhaps an opening gambit for a major offensive around Saigon--have been spotted by allied intelligence in Viet Nam. Deputy Negotiator Cyrus Vance warned that a full-dress attack could jeopardize the peace talks and would certainly be met by a military counterattack. Still, there were some signs of Christmas good will in gestures made in and around the actual battle zone.

Hanoi had indicated that it might set free a small number of captive U.S. flyers.* Cambodia's volatile Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in the latest upswing of his roller-coaster relations with the U.S., unconditionally released a helicopter crewman and eleven U.S. servicemen whose landing craft strayed into Cambodian waters last July. Originally, Sihanouk had demanded a ransom of bulldozers. And the Viet Cong offered to hold a parley with U.S. officials during the coming Christmas truce to work out ways of freeing three Americans held in jungle camps. The guerrilla offer had a catch to it. The two sides were to meet in Tay Ninh province, 50 miles northwest of Saigon, beneath a Viet Cong flag--posing a dilemma for U.S. authorities, who must try to devise a way to get back the American prisoners without according recognition to the rebels.

* There was speculation that an even more dramatic release of captive Americans might come just before Christmas. In Washington there were guarded hopes that North Korea was about to free the 82 crewmen of the U.S. electronic surveillance ship Pueblo, which was seized last January.

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