A Scramble for Real Estate

At key points in South Viet Nam, allied forces last week were placed on alert in anticipation of a new enemy offensive. Captured documents, prisoner interrogations and exhortations broadcast by the clandestine Viet Cong radio pointed to an imminent push--perhaps to coincide with the eighth anniversary of the founding of the guerrillas' National Liberation Front on Dec. 20.

While rumors of a new Communist drive have bedeviled Saigon frequently since August, allied officers were not inclined to dismiss the current crop out of hand. Heavy action near the Cambodian border, a sharp upsurge of activity in the Demilitarized Zone and the presence of perhaps 1,000 Viet Cong sappers (demolition experts) and other agents in Saigon all pointed to trouble.

The objective of such an offensive would, of course, be to create as much disruption and seize as much real estate as possible in the South before the negotiators in Paris finally get down to serious discussions. The Communists are fully aware that possession is nine-tenths of the war, as it is of the law, and that the more territory they can secure before the talks get serious, the better their bargaining position will be.

Stripped Stage. Allied troops have countered by tightening up their defense rings around major cities and by boring in on the logistical groundwork that must precede any successful offensive. "If you can destroy the people who are preparing the battlefield, then the guys on the border can't get there," explained a U.S. general. Thus, last week three regiments of the 1st Marine Division ended a three-week cordon operation in Quang Nam province south of Danang that stripped the area as a staging ground. They moved all 2,650 civilians out of the village of Thanh Phong, then encircled and hunted down infiltrators from a regiment of North Vietnamese regulars. The bag from Operation Meade River: 1,050 enemy dead v. 107 allied losses. Other units throughout South Viet Nam were engaged in similar operations, beating the woods and fields for bunkers, arms caches and stores of food and medicine.

Even while they worked to thwart a major new military push, allied forces were becoming engaged as never before with the "other war"--the U.S.-directed pacification effort. Under any compromise reached in Paris, the political loyalties of the 12,000 hamlets that dot South Viet Nam's countryside could have a profound effect on the future of the national government. With that in mind, President Nguyen Van Thieu last October launched a major drive to secure 1,120 new hamlets before the Tet holiday next February. Nearly half of all U.S. military operations are now launched in support of this political effort, and the work is apparently beginning to pay off: last week the U.S. announced that 73.3% of South Viet Nam's population is under government control, up 6.5% in two months. It is even higher than totals claimed before the disastrous Tet offensive--though some observers believe that it may be considerably inflated.

Ruff-Puffs. Under the accelerated program, contested hamlets--and a few that are enemy-controlled--are entered by government Regional Forces or Popular Forces (nicknamed Ruff-Puffs).

Once secured from Viet Cong attack, the civilian population gets treatment from medical teams, entertainment from folksong groups that spread anti-Viet Cong messages, and training in self-defense. Eventually, the effort will be directed at the next highest political level -- South Viet Nam's 2,400 villages.

Parallel to the pacification program is the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program, which offers bonuses to defectors and those who help them. In November, an average of 568 enemy troops turned themselves in each week, the highest weekly rate in 18 months. In the Delta provinces of Vinh Long and Kien Hoa, desertion became so rampant among the Viet Cong that local leaders collected all weapons, which bring an extra bonanza to defectors. Another auxiliary program, however, is lagging badly. Resettlement of refugees has barely begun, and roughly 1,200,000 Vietnamese remain homeless and often hungry.

For the Record. Even the encouraging reports from the hamlets are heavily qualified. There is a constant danger that the government Ruff-Puffs will spread themselves too thin in the process of securing new hamlets. Moreover, Thieu's program concentrates mainly on defense, and a great deal more constructive civilian aid may be necessary to secure the villagers' loyalty. Program Director William E. Colby cautiously sums up the results as "moderately positive," but he admits that the pacification successes are fragile at best. On the other hand, it has worked well enough to force the Viet Cong into employing a variety of countermeasures, from political agitation to outright terrorism.

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