Friday, Sep. 27, 1968
Back to the Old Dueling Ground
The Soviet Union was able to invade Czechoslovakia with reasonable confidence that the West would not interfere. A Soviet threat to West Germany, however, is quite another matter. Twice last week, the Kremlin pointedly noted that it felt free to move against the Bonn government to curb any revival of neo-Nazism. With seven crack Soviet divisions massed in Czechoslovakia near the Bavarian border--the largest military buildup on the eastern frontier since 1945--Bonn did not take the threat lightly. Neither did Bonn's allies, who warned that a Soviet attack would bring "an immediate allied response." Said a U.S. diplomat: "What we told the Russians was that if they carried through with their threat, they would have World War III."
Fresh Complaints. The Soviet squeeze against Bonn began almost unnoticed last November, when Moscow dusted off two sections of the 1945 United Nations charter. The clauses gave the victor states (obviously including Russia) the right to intervene unilaterally against the renewal of an aggressive policy by an "enemy state." Russia claims that this applies to any "neo-Nazi" threat in West Germany. The U.S., Britain and France have assured Bonn in the past that the NATO treaty, which guarantees an allied riposte to any attack on West Germany, makes the clauses obsolete. Nonetheless, all three decided to put it in writing for the Kremlin after the Russians coupled their Czech invasion with an intense propaganda attack on Bonn. Both Pravda and Izvestia responded to the allied notes with fresh complaints of West German "militarism and revanchism."
Western strategists suggested that Moscow might be pinching the cold war's most sensitive nerve to divert attention from its repression of CzechoSlovakia. By fostering a crisis atmosphere, the Russians might be seeking a pretext for stationing Soviet troops in Rumania. On the theory that nothing unites reluctant allies like a good common enemy, Soviet leaders may also hope to heal some of the deep splits among Eastern European nations by sounding alarms about neo-Nazism in West Germany. With the first planning session for its long-sought Communist summit scheduled to begin this week in Budapest, the Kremlin needs every bit of support it can muster from fellow Communist countries.
Growing Consternation. On another level, Moscow is reacting to deep-seated fears of a new German Drang nach Osten (thrust to the East). Since 1966, when Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt began courting the countries of East Europe, their policy has proved eminently successful. It won diplomatic recognition for Bonn from Rumania, a strong hint of recognition from Hungary, and increased trade from other nations.
Moscow's campaign to undermine or at least discredit the Bonn regime is not expected to involve overt military action. While U.S. officials do not discount the Kremlin's tough language entirely, they tend to think that the Russians are well aware that an armed confrontation in West Germany could swiftly lead to cataclysm. Anxious to emphasize its concern nonetheless, the U.S. last week announced that NATO maneuvers, originally scheduled for mid-1969, may be moved up to the first of the year. On several occasions, top State Department officials reiterated that the allies viewed the situation with the utmost gravity.
It was apparent in any event that Moscow had chosen once again to make West Germany a cold-war dueling ground. Said one U.S. official: "Before this Administration ends, it will have to deal with another Berlin crisis."
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