Civilized Coup

Coup-ridden Iraq seldom overthrows its leaders gently. In 1958, Iraqis gunned down King Feisal II and dismembered Premier Nuri as-Said's corpse. When they deposed Soldier-President Abdul Karim Kassem in 1963, the rebels tommy-gunned him, dragged his body to a television studio, then switched on the cameras to show the public the gruesome spectacle. Last week there was an other coup in Iraq, but this time it was relatively civilized.

At 3 a.m. one night, a high-ranking army officer rang up slumbering President Abdul Rahman Aref and announced: "I am speaking from the Ministry of Defense. Tanks are now proceeding toward the palace." Aref received quick confirmation when five warning shots split the quiet night. He chose to capitulate. Soon, with hardly a hint of further violence, he was put aboard a special Iraqi airliner to join his ailing wife in London. In his place, a nine-man, military "revolutionary Command Council" effortlessly established itself in power.

Careful Planning. Iraq was ripe for revolt. Under the regime of General Aref, who took over in 1966 after his predecessor and brother Abdul Salem Aref died in a mysterious helicopter crash, the country suffered from so much corruption that the Premier, Lieut. General Taher Yahya, was widely known as "the Thief of Baghdad." A poor administrator and weak boss, Aref bore the additional stigma of last year's defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel. He offended many citizens by decreeing further delays in Iraq's decade-long "transition" from military rule to parliamentary democracy, seemed unable to get the oil-rich economy moving. Chief among those who wished to bring about a change in stagnating Iraq were the members of the right-leaning but revolutionary Baath party, who had not tasted power since Abdul Salem Aref booted them out of his government late in 1963.

A leading victim of that purge was ex-Premier Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, a retired major general and a Baathist from the movement's romantic early days. Though Al-Bakr retired to his Baghdad home, he constantly plotted against the Arefs. One abortive but memorable 1964 attempt involved six Baathist air force MIG pilots, who planned to shoot down the presidential transport as it lifted from a runway. When worsening conditions in the country this year gave Al-Bakr a better chance to regain power, he started meeting at his house with 13 retired officer-politicians. In April, the group presented a petition to Aref for extensive reforms, including general elections within two years. When Aref balked, Al-Bakr and his friends began meticulously to plan last week's coup. They executed it with the help of the air force and even of Arefs trusted presidential guards. There was practically no bloodshed; the only marks of battle were a few bullet holes in the palace.

Unity for Now. Since the new junta consists of non-Baathist rightists and centrists as well as Al-Bakr and his friends, an inner power struggle may develop. Showing unity for the moment at least, the new rulers went through the standard motions of damning the previous regime and delivering vague promises of "national unity" and coming democracy. Aref and his backers, they said with customary hyperbole, were "opportunists, thieves, ignorant, illiterate Zionist spies."

Though there were some hints of coolness toward Cairo and toward the fanatical Baathists who dominate neighboring Syria, the junta gave no indication of whether it wishes to resume diplomatic relations with the U.S. or loosen Iraq's considerable ties with Moscow, which has given it 1,000 technicians and enough armament to replace the June war losses. The junta took over the property of 26 ousted officials and gave a clear warning against corruption by jailing the Thief of Baghdad. That action in itself persuaded many Iraqis that the new regime may be an improvement if it survives long enough to make its impact felt.

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