The Bombing Pause

In the wake of the Communists' savage Tet offensive against the cities of South Viet Nam, Lyndon Johnson launched what Washington officials subsequently labeled an "AtoZ" review of the war. This week, in a prime-time Sunday evening television address to the nation, the President made clear that the reappraisal had been far more definitive than had been expected. In a dramatic and unexpected turnabout, he announced what he called "a unilateral step toward deescalation." Its major feature, he said, would be a halt in all U.S.' aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet Nam. Only that portion adjacent to the demilitarized zone would be exempted from the order.

Johnson said the bombing pause will affect 90% of the North's population and even more of its real estate. How long it lasts depends on Hanoi.

Easing the Burden. Before Johnson spoke, rumors had swirled around the capital that he would announce the dis patch of roughly 30,000 more U.S. troops to Viet Nam--in addition to the 525,000 already authorized. Instead, he announced that only 13,500 more men would be sent in the next five months.

In addition, the President emphasized that steps were being taken to improve the efficiency of South Viet Nam's armed forces in order to ease the heavy burden of fighting that the U.S. now shoulders. Top priority has been assigned to re-equipping the South Vietnamese, particularly with armored personnel carriers, mortars and rapid firing M-16 rifles.

The other moves went virtually unnoticed, however, as all attention fo cused on the bombing pause--and why Johnson timed its announcement when he did. Politics, of course, were thought to have played a major role. With Wisconsin's primary two days off, it was presumed he had hoped that a move toward peace might neutralize the formidable challenge to his renommation that was being posed by Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy. In addition, his popularity hit an all-time low in a Gallup poll released this week. Only 36% of those questioned approved of his conduct of the presidency (v. 48% in January); only 26% approved of his conduct of the war (v. 39%).

Obviously, the Tet offensive had much to do with Johnson's slide. Administration officials still believe that the attacks were a costly military failure for the Communists. But they concede that Tet had severely damaging psychological effects on the U.S. pub lic In its aftermath, Johnson began his reexamination of the U.S. war effort. To help him conduct the review, he summoned General Creighton ("Abe") Abrams, the tough, cigar-chomping tank commander who is the second-ranking

U.S. officer in Viet Nam, to Washington for two days of intensive talks. Abrams is believed to be in line to succeed General William C. Westmoreland as commander of all U.S. forces in Viet Nam when Westy leaves, probably May 15, to become the Army's new Chief of Staff.

Midnight Draft. At the same time, the President began formulating his Sunday address. Working with him on the speech were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, White House Aides Walt Rostow Harry McPherson and George Christian. General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Stall, was consulted. Also at Johnson's side, surprisingly, was Robert S. McNamara.

Johnson probably wrote more of the speech than any major talk he has ever given. Saturday afternoon he toiled over it in the sunshine on the south lawn. Working past midnight he went over it line by line, carrying pencils and i draft of the speech with him all weekend to sitting-room and dining-room, bedroom and study.

In his speech Johnson described the bombing pause as a genuine attempt to save lives and to reduce the level of hostilities along the lines he laid down last Sept. 29 in his San Antonio speech. The heart of the San Antonio formula was this statement: "The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet Nam when this will lead promptly to productive discussion. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

In the past, the Administration has demanded advance evidence from Hanoi that it would not, in fact, exploit the U.S. move. This proviso has now been dropped. Instead, Johnson urged Britain and the Soviet Union, co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference that ended the Indochina war, to do all within their power to move Hanoi toward talks. He announced that Roving Ambassador Averell Harriman and Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador to Moscow, would be available to go to Geneva or any other suitable locale to talk peace. He urged Ho Chi Minh to respond positively.

And if Ho does not? Obviously, what has been stopped may be started again, perhaps with greater intensity. It is difficult to see how Ho could accept that prospect with equanimity, in view of the destruction that has already been wrought. The Administration, in fact, is convinced that U.S. airpower has mauled the enemy far more cruelly than has been suggested. Around Khe Sanh, eight-jet B-52s and dartlike fighter-bombers have cratered the nearby hills with 80,000 tons of bombs in the past two months--more than was dropped on Japan during the entire four years of World War II. In light of that fact, it may be difficult for Ho to turn down the chance for a breather. In any case, Johnson's unilateral move has now placed the onus unmistakably on Hanoi.

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