Arms for Embracing

Peter the Great, who dreamed more than two centuries ago of extending Russian influence into the Middle East, would have been pleased by the scene. There, deep in Egypt's interior, stood wide-cheeked, suntanned men in business suits, towheaded kids with braces on their teeth and sturdy blonde women waving Soviet flags. The Russians and their families, in fact, almost eclipsed the Egyptians at last week's ceremony marking the dedication of a memorial to Soviet-Egyptian friendship and the completion of major construction on the Aswan High Dam, whose 364-ft.-high wall of concrete and clay blocks the Nile 560 miles upstream from Cairo. Because Soviet Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev decided not to come as planned and sent a deputy instead. Gamal Abdel Nasser made it even more of a Soviet show by staying away in a fit of pique.

The Soviet presence at Aswan was not only a reminder of the Russian money (some $325 million) and know-how that went into the huge hydroelectric project but also a symbol of what has become a growing Soviet penetration of the Arab world. The penetration is largely in the form of military and economic assistance combined with a cultural drive, and the Russians have so far been unable to convert much of it into solid political power. In an area that the West has often found difficult and unrewarding to deal with, the penetration also brings the Russians as many problems as opportunities. Still, the Russians think it important to establish themselves firmly in the Arab world--and that is just what they are trying hard to do.

Using Leverage. Faced by the vacuum that resulted when the Arabs turned on the West during the Arab-Israeli war in June, the Russians seized the opportunity. From Morocco on the Atlantic to South Yemen on the Arabian Sea, they are supplying weapons, training troops, running aid programs and generally making themselves useful in areas that until recently were Western preserves. To match their new stake in the area, they have increased their Mediterranean fleet to some 50 ships, which thus equals in number, if not in firepower, the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Such ports as Algeria's Mers-el-Kebir, Egypt's Alexandria and Syria's Latakia are filled with souvenir-shopping Soviet sailors these days. So far, only the oil-rich kingdoms of Libya, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states have resisted Russia's advances.

The Soviets have used the disastrous postwar state of the Arab armies and air forces as leverage to increase Arab dependence on Russia. They have since replaced about 80% of all the equipment lost by the Arabs in the war, including 80 new MIG-21 fighters and SU-9 fighter-bombers and 200 tanks for Egypt, 40 planes and 100 tanks for Syria and 20 planes for Iraq. In addition, the Russians have given Egypt, Syria and Algeria some 40 Komar patrol boats, which carry the Styx missile of the type that sank the Israeli destroyer Elath off Port Said last October. The Soviets have doubled the number of military advisers in Egypt to at least 2,000 and have sent large training missions to Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

In the absence of U.S. competition, Russia has won new customers in the Mideast who had previously bought only Western wares. It has made a deal to sell $110 million in military trucks and assorted gear to the Shah of Iran, is rearming the Sudanese army, which previously used British equipment, and may even find a client in Jordan's pro-Western King Hussein, who has not yet received from the U.S. the 36 Lockheed Starfighters that he had ordered before the June conflict. In the wake of the Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen, Russia has also swiftly increased its presence in that strife-torn country, where Soviet advisers with Republican forces have even flown combat missions against the Royalists.

Aid & Ballet. The Soviets now run the biggest development program in an area that desperately needs industrialization. Their engineers have started work on a dam on the Euphrates that will supply electricity to much of Syria, and are prospecting for oil in Egypt. In all, Soviet teams are engaged in 100 or so major projects, including the construction of a steel plant in Algeria, a railroad in Iraq, a machine-tool plant in Iran, and a fish-meal factory in Yemen. Russian culture follows the Red flag. In Alexandria, young girls are quitting belly-dance classes and attending the recently opened Russian ballet school instead. Soviet folk-dance groups and circus troupes tour the major Arab cities. Russian films play at the cinemas and on state-owned television, and Soviet books and periodicals that are skillfully prepared in Arabic now cram Arab bookstores. Arab universities now stress Russian language courses.

The Russians are frustrated by their inability to exchange some of the benefits they bestow for real political power. Recognizing the Islamic aversion to Communism, they are forced to ignore the local Communist parties, which are outlawed in most Arab countries, and deal with governments that often prove recalcitrant. The Russians have been unable to influence the Syrians toward moderation, and Nasser refuses their advice as often as he takes it. The deeper their penetration becomes, the more they are bound to be caught up in the bitter quarrels and mutual hatreds that rack the Middle East. Moreover, they know full well that the Arabs still depend for much of their income on Western oil companies. Since they have neither the money nor the need for that much oil, the Russians have so far been content to leave the Western oil companies alone.

None of the Arab leaders shows any desire to become a Russian satellite. In fact, Nasser and some other leaders would like to find a saving formula by which they could re-establish relations with the U.S. and thus resume their balancing act between Russians and Americans. Washington has so far seen fit not to respond to such hints, but the time must come when, if it does not want the Russians to tighten their hold on Arabia irretrievably, the U.S. must try to restore American influence in the area.

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