After the War

BEYOND VIETNAM; THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA by Edwin O. Reischauer. 242 pages. Knopf. $4.95.

Books about Viet Nam have become a sizable industry. In 1967 alone, more than 50 authors produced observations, histories and critiques of various kinds; some of them are reasoned and informed, too many of them either superficial or passionately prejudiced (see box). Edwin Reischauer, 57, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, who now teaches Japanese history and politics at Harvard, has written a different Viet Nam book. True to its title, it ranges far beyond that country. Despite Reischauer's severe strictures against U.S. policy, it is a responsible and a hopeful book; despite its sober style, it glows with devotion both to the U.S. and to Asia.

About Viet Nam Reischauer is far from the conventional dove. He believes that getting involved there was a mistake, chiefly because the U.S. can not from the outside provide the leadership, the will and the social reforms that Vietnamese society itself has failed to supply. He also believes that if Viet Nam had gone Communist in the early '50s, it would not have mattered much to U.S. interests. At present he favors cessation of the bombing but a continued, strong military buildup behind a barrier along the 17th parallel, to persuade the Viet Cong that they cannot win and must negotiate. Under his peace plan, the Viet Cong would be given undisputed rule of the areas they now control. The next stage calls for North and South Viet Nam to be united as one country whose neutrality would be guaranteed by international agreements.

Less Is More. If and when the problem of Viet Nam is settled, the U.S. must tackle a far more crucial task: a revamping of American policy toward China. As a century-long friend of China, the U.S. reacted like a "jilted lover" when the Chinese Communists took over after World War II. In Reischauer's view, it was necessary to contain

Communist China in the 1950s, and it remains necessary today.

But he also believes that the U.S. grossly overestimates Peking's power and its ability to threaten let alone conquer other Asian nations. He thinks that the U.S. blundered by waging a worldwide campaign to isolate Red China (though he concedes that China did a great deal to isolate itself), and he regards as "silly" and a "sham" the U.S. policy of recognizing the Nationalist regime on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. Reischauer's prescription: grant immediate diplomatic recognition to Mao Tse-tung, seek Chinese admission to the U.N., and declare publicly that the U.S. wishes harmonious relations with China. He knows that this would have no immediate influence on Mao Tse-tung and the present Peking regime, but he is obviously thinking about another generation of Chinese leaders.

For the long range, Reischauer counsels less not more direct U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S. Seventh Fleet should continue to shield the island nations, and the line must be held in Korea. But elsewhere, the U.S. should disengage, at least militarily. Reischauer believes that the general trend in Asia is favorable to U.S. interests anyway. That trend is nationalism, and Reischauer believes that U.S. aid, wisely and unobtrusively administered, can promote the growth of healthy national states in Asia. He also holds out hope for regional groupings, and banks heavily on the progressive influence of Japan.

No Arrogance. Reischauer may be too complacent about China (he mentions Peking's nuclear weapons only in passing). And he may also be too relaxed about the possibility of continental Asian nations going Communist despite U.S. economic and political aid. But in sum, his book reflects reason, professional skill--and the opposite of the neoisolationists' posture. Referring to Senator Fulbright's frequent complaints about the American "arrogance of power," Reischauer maintains to the contrary that "we have shown extraordinarily little arrogance. We might more correctly be accused of showing naivete in the use of power." The U.S. should have more confidence in "our ideals and institu tions and in the good sense of Asians." It is such confidence, argues Reischauer, that ultimately will influence the people of Asia.

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