Beginning to Face Defeat

The invitation was for dinner at the presidential villa, and Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, former Vice President of Egypt, ex-commander of its armed forces, accepted with pleasure.

It seemed like old times -- the friendly days before Nasser fired him for losing the war with Israel. The illusion did not last long. At dinner, Nasser in formed the marshal that he was under house arrest.

Similar scenes were played all over Cairo last week. At Nasser's orders, military police scoured the city, arrested more than 100 colonels and generals suspected of discontent. The dragnet also picked up the former War Minister, the former director of military prisons, four parliamentary Deputies and the government information chief. No hard evidence was offered to suggest that the arrested officials were actually plotting to overthrow the government.

Their confinement seemed merely precautionary. For the first time since the war, Nasser was preparing to leave the country, and he wanted to be sure he could get back in.

Suggestion to the Brothers. Nasser's destination was Khartoum, where the leaders of the Arab world were gathering at one more summit in one more attempt to forge a united front against Israel. And once more, all hopes for unity were shot down even before the meetings began. Fearing that the old cries for jihad (holy war) were about to be toned down, Algeria's leftist President, Houari Boumediene, decided the meeting was not worth bothering about.

He sent his Foreign Minister instead.

At home, meanwhile, he played to the Arab grandstands by nationalizing two American-owned oil-distribution companies. Syria, where the Six-Day War is called "the Temporary Setback," sent Foreign Minister Ibrahim Makhous to Khartoum, then recalled him before the summit began. "There is no prospect for positive action," the departing Makhous announced.

That estimate was reasonably accurate, even though some Arab leaders seemed somewhat inclined to begin facing the consequences of defeat. Led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the rich oil-producing states agreed to put up $392 million to rebuild Egypt and Jordan--on condition that they be allowed to resume oil shipments to the West. But instead of pursuing destructive schemes for all-out rearmament against Israel, the summit dwelt on more sober thoughts. Nasser himself set the tone.

He would be willing to fight Israel again, he told his fellow rulers, but only if all Arab states turn over half their national income to help prepare for the battle. Since that seemed hardly likely, Nasser quickly added: "We feel the time is not ripe for a military adventure and suggest to the brothers that they consider the possibilities for a political solution to the problems that face us." In other words, negotiate for the return of their land now tightly held by the Israelis.

Tito's Plan. Just how the Arabs might negotiate with a country they refuse to recognize is far from clear. And it is doubtful whether any concessions they are prepared to offer would come close to satisfying Israel. There were hints, for example, that the Arabs might agree to the peace plan being peddled by Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito. But Israel has already turned thumbs down on the idea that the Arabs, in return for their lost lands, would open the Suez Canal to Israeli cargoes, the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel shipping, and declare an end to the "state of hostilities" that has been in effect ever since Israel was created in 1948. Having settled for similar promises in 1956, the Israelis are not likely to repeat the error.

One agreement of sorts did come out of Khartoum. In a two-hour conference at the home of Sudanese Premier Mohammed Mahgoub, Nasser and Saudi Arabia's King Feisal promised to stop their five-year confrontation in Yemen. They signed a treaty under which Nasser will pull out the 20,000 troops that now prop up Yemen's Leftist Premier Abdullah Sallal, Feisal will stop sending arms to Sallal's tough Royalist enemies, and three neutral Arab states will send in observers to make sure that no one cheats. If carried out as promised, that pact would almost certainly result in the fall of Sallal, and the Yemen Premier immediately let out a loud complaint. Big Brother, he wailed, had betrayed him. But Nasser had no other choice. So desperately close to ruin has the Israeli war left Egypt that he simply cannot afford the expense of keeping troops in Yemen. He can barely afford to keep them in Cairo.

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