Toughened Mood

Only a month ago, peace in Viet Nam was, in British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's words, "almost within our grasp." Last week it seemed as far out of reach as ever.

By land, sea and air, the U.S. tightened the screws on North Viet Nam. American 175-mm. artillery pounded targets north of the Demilitarized Zone at the 17th parallel. Navy planes seeded Northern rivers with mines. Seventh Fleet ships blasted the North's coast with 5-and 8-in. guns. On their side, the Communists began pounding U.S. installations with powerful 140-mm. Russian rockets (see THE WORLD).

Slamming Doors. President Johnson declined to characterize the U.S. moves as "escalation," but agreed that the level of the war had obviously changed. "This is action over and above what has been taking place over the last few weeks," he noted. "Certainly, it is more far-reaching." As Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara explained later in the week, the new steps "are supplemental to the air campaign." What makes them all the more important is the fact that U.S. intelligence has uncovered new signs that the North Vietnamese are attempting to increase supply movements toward the South. Moreover, as many as 35,000 fresh Communist troops are believed to have moved into place just north of the DMZ.

Clearly, the mood on both sides has toughened. Even United Nations Secretary General U Thant's meeting in his native Burma with a North Vietnamese delegation failed to spark any hope that the men from Hanoi had anything besides propaganda to offer. In Washington, the feeling has grown that Hanoi has been given plenty of chances to talk--and has repeatedly scorned them. "We leave the door open," said a Pentagon official, "and it's only slammed in our face." The President, accordingly, seems to have concluded that more military pressure against the North offers the only hope for peace. "I don't see any other alternative," he admitted.

Act of Trust. New York's Senator Robert F. Kennedy, on the other hand, thought he discerned any number of alternatives. In a 6,000-word Senate speech preceded by two weeks of publicity, Bobby urged the Administration to declare a bombing halt on the chance that Hanoi would then consent to peace talks. To prevent the Communists from using the cessation to resupply their troops in the South, he urged the U.S. to declare that "discussions cannot continue for a prolonged period without an agreement that neither side will substantially increase the size of the war." Further, any settlement should include "all the major political elements in South Viet Nam"--including the Viet Cong.

When Kennedy ended his 45-minute address, Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield leaped to his feet. Apprehensive over how Hanoi would interpret the speech, he assured that it did not represent "a break between the Administration and the Senator from New York." He was almost alone in that opinion. For one thing, Kennedy urged a halt in the bombing on the strength of a tentative promise from Hanoi to negotiate; Johnson insists on some solid reciprocal move from the North--not a mere promise. For another, Kennedy, recalling Prime Minister Wilson's claim that "one single act of trust" during last month's Tet pause could have brought peace, believes the U.S. should perform the act; the Administration replies that Wilson was blaming Hanoi, not Washington, for withholding the crucial act of trust.

Aware that Kennedy's speech would command considerable attention, the Administration took considerable pains to soften its impact. Before Bobby began speaking, Johnson casually dropped the news that Moscow had agreed to talks on "means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles." The U.S., said the President, was anxious to dissuade the Russians from deploying an anti-ballistic missile system that might force Washington to increase drastically its own missile program. Just as Bobby took the floor, the President had a letter delivered to Washington's Democratic Senator Henry M. Jackson vowing that the bombing would end "when the other side is willing to take equivalent action as part of a serious effort to end this war." Through the day, Johnson sought to upstage Bobby by making newsworthy sorties to Howard University's 100th anniversary celebrations and a ceremony marking the centennial of the U.S. Office of Education.

It fell to Secretary of State Dean Rusk to deliver the Administration's official reply to Bobby. What Kennedy proposed, said Rusk, was "substantially similar" to Administration actions explored "without result" many times in the past. "We have had bombing pauses of five days in 1965, 37 days in December-January 1965-66, and six days just two weeks ago," he said. "And we encountered only hostile actions in response."

Stop & Go. Indeed, another futile bombing pause aimed at improving the prospects for peace could have precisely the opposite effect. "With every cessation of bombing," observed New York Representative Emanuel Celler, "the hopes of our people for peace rose, only to be dashed by the negation of peace by the North Vietnamese." Because such frustration only intensifies demands for escalating the war, he said, "it is foolhardy to play with the emotions of our people by continued stop-and-go signs." To U.S. military planners, more than emotions are involved. A pause, said General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Viet Nam, "will cost many additional lives and probably prolong the conflict."

Additional support for Johnson came from Congress. After two weeks of debate, the Senate passed a $4.5 billion supplemental appropriation bill for the war in Viet Nam--and battled down an attempt by Pennsylvania's Democratic Senator Joseph Clark to tack on an amendment demanding that the U.S. either declare war or freeze troop levels in the South at 500,000 (nearly 415,000 are already there). Convinced that Clark's rider would be defeated so decisively that the vote would be interpreted by U.S. hawks as a blank check for unlimited escalation, Mansfield performed some fancy legislative footwork. He offered a meaningless substitute amendment calling for a negotiated settlement of the war "that would preserve the honor of the U.S.," thus managed to shelve Clark's embarrassing proposal.

Romantic Revolutionaries. Though the Administration seemed more than ever to be digging in for a long, hard fight, something of the hope that stiffens Johnson against his critics was lucidly expressed by White House Security Adviser Walt W. Rostow. Speaking at the University of Leeds in England, Rostow said that the "aggressive, romantic revolutionaries" who long have disturbed world peace--Ho Chi Minn and Mao Tse-tung, to name two--must soon give way to leaders who will make a new era of tranquillity possible. "If we have the common will to hold together and get on with the job," he predicted, "the struggle in Viet Nam might be the last great confrontation of the postwar era."

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.