Reformers in Crisis

The grand ideal of U.S. juvenile courts is that errant children are best handled by informal "civil" proceedings rather than stigmatized by criminal trials. In theory, youngsters cannot be accused or convicted of adult crimes. When adjudged delinquent, they may be put on probation and doctored by social workers, or sent to training schools for "rehabilitation"--all supposedly in their own best interests. In fact, the ideal is now under heavy fire.

As they have shielded youngsters from the rigors of the adversary system, juvenile courts have operated farther and farther outside the Constitution. Today young Americans generally have no right to bail, counsel or public jury trial. One quarter of the country's juvenile court judges have had no legal training; lawyers appear in less than 5% of juvenile cases. Committal is often based on hearsay evidence; the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Not only does incarceration often exceed adult sentences for the same offenses; for lack of youth facilities, 100,000 delinquents a year wind up in adult jails.

Worst of Both Worlds. Last March the Supreme Court gave warning of its attitude in a decision that applied only to the District of Columbia. Accused of rape, robbery and housebreaking, Morris A. Kent Jr., 16, had been under the "exclusive jurisdiction" of Washington's Juvenile Court Judge Orman W. Ketcham. Instead, the boy was tried as an adult, given a 30-to-90-year sentence. The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Ketcham had wrongly "waived" jurisdiction without giving Kent counsel, hearing or explanation.

"While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts," wrote Justice Abe Fortas, "there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."

Two pending cases lend urgency to Fortas' fears. In 1957 Robert A. Miller, 16, was picked up for auto theft in Seattle, summarily sent to an adult court and given a ten-year sentence. Now 25, and still in prison, Miller argues that he was denied due process and equal protection of the laws. Last month, acting as his own counsel, Miller won a crucial round: the Supreme Court agreed to review his case--the first state juvenile proceeding to reach the nation's highest tribunal.

As a result of Florida Indigent Clarence Gideon's famous victory in 1963, all American adults now enjoy the right to counsel in felony cases. Now Florida may also produce a "junior Gideon" in the case of Thomas W. Parker, 16. Last fall Parker was accused of burglarizing a hotel room, stealing a car, and robbing an old man of 60-c- at pistol point. Denied counsel, Parker was sent to a training school until the age of 21. On appeal, the American Civil Liberties Union argued that a youngster is entitled to a lawyer whenever the charges against him equal adult felonies. Having lost Round 1, the A.C.L.U. is taking Parker's case to the Florida Supreme Court.

Impressive Future. Meanwhile, good juvenile courts are striving to set a reforming example. The problem, though, is to work out an effective compromise. Can a court really be half constitutional and half therapeutic? The very notion that juvenile courts can "change" errant kids may be a false piety. Judge Ketcham, for one, would prefer a new kind of family court that retains informal procedures only for children under 16, while applying criminal-law rules as well as training-school treatment to youths between 16 and 21.

Whatever the ultimate model, it had better be working by 1975--the date; according to present population trends, when roughly 40% of all Americans will be aged 21 or under. In a decade, juvenile courts may well be handling almost as many cases as the nation's adult criminal courts.

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