Friday, Mar. 18, 1966
The Cost of Moving
France's North Atlantic Treaty partners have long since resigned themselves to a breakup in the family provoked by Charles de Gaulle. Many thought he would disavow the treaty--or, at the very least, insist on NATO's complete overhaul and reform. But last week, in letters penned by the master of the Elysee in his long, sloping hand and sent to President Johnson and other NATO-country chiefs, De Gaulle at last spelled out his concept of a separation agreement. It turned out that he had in mind neither a complete divorce nor a fresh start.
De Gaulle had no intention of "challenging" the basic treaty. The problem, as he saw it, was "the organization" of NATO, which calls for French troops under integrated NATO command and the presence on French soil of NATO men and materiel. France would have been happy to negotiate reforms, but helas, wrote De Gaulle, the other NATO countries were "all partisans of the maintenance of the status quo." Therefore France would soon unilaterally withdraw its own remaining forces from NATO commands. And NATO, in turn, would be required "to transfer out of French territory."
Brains & Nerves. De Gaulle's ultimatum was a blow at the heart of the alliance. For France is not only the geographic center of the NATO defense area, stretching from Great Britain to Turkey, it also houses the brains and nerves of NATO's vast, interlocking command system (see map). Among the men and facilities that will have to be transplanted beyond French frontiers if De Gaulle follows through on his ultimatum to the last detail:
> SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, with its 500 officers and 2,500 men at Rocquencourt, near Paris.
> EUCOM, U.S. European Command headquarters, with 850 men near Saint-Germain-en-Laye, the administrative center for all U.S. forces in Europe.
> AFCENT, Allied Forces Central Europe, with a staff of 2,000 at Fontainebleau.
> NATO's $550 million communications network, an electronic web of everything from microwave to tropospheric scatter and leased land lines.
> NADGE, NATO Air Defense Ground Environment, a $300 million planned modernization of the alliance's early-warning system.
> Some 26,000 U.S. servicemen, including many airmen at fighter bases like Evreux and Chateauroux; they man nine airfields, some 40 supply depots, and supervise port facilities and three NATO and one U.S. fuel pipeline traversing France.
Psychological Blow. The cost of moving or duplicating the U.S. and NATO presence now in France is variously estimated at from $300 million to more than $1 billion. Alternate port and supply facilities are readily available through the Low Countries and at North German ports. The U.S. and Canadian fighter groups could well be based in Britain; Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg are likely spots for relocating the command headquarters. The shift would be expensive and annoying, but the defense of Europe--including France--would ultimately be little affected, as De Gaulle well knows and in fact admits in wanting to remain an alliance member, enabling him to have NATO's defense for France and kick it too.
More threatening is the psychological blow to the alliance and the principle of integration, both for defense and as a means of preventing nuclear proliferation. Nearly every European country has its narrow nationalists, and Gaullist unilateralism offers an example they might seize on. But the U.S. and the other NATO nations have no intention of letting separatism spread or dealing with De Gaulle bilaterally, as he would like. Johnson and Germany's Ludwig Erhard both told the general as much in replies sent off within hours after receiving his letter, and at week's end the allies sat down to draft a joint 14-nation reply--as an alliance--to De Gaulle's demands.
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