Is There Really Anything to Negotiate?

Supposing the War to have commenced upon a just Motive; the next Thing to be considered is when a Prince ought in Prudence to receive the Overtures of a Peace: Which I take to be, either when the Enemy is ready to yield the Point originally contended for, or when that Point is found impossible to be ever obtained.

That is how Jonathan Swift defined the necessary conditions for ending a war. There is no sign that these conditions have been reached in Viet Nam. The U.S. is certainly not yielding the point it is contending for--the independence of South Viet Nam--and has certainly not concluded that this goal is impossible to attain. Conversely, the enemy does not appear ready to yield his point either--that the U.S. must be driven out of Viet Nam--and, as far as anyone can tell so far, has not been persuaded that this goal is unattainable.

Under the circumstances, it is highly questionable just what negotiations could accomplish. Amid the current U.S. peace overtures, there is a widespread, hopeful feeling that if only both sides start talking, peace will follow. In fact, it is hard to see what, if anything, the U.S. and the Communists could find to negotiate about at the present time with any expectation of results.

Hanoi has spelled out its aims in four points, and they add up to outright withdrawal of U.S. troops and the seizure of South Viet Nam by the Viet Cong. Washington counters with its own 14 points, which actually go a considerable way toward creating areas for negotiation--but which are easily misunderstood, unless the fine print and the implicit qualifications are kept in mind. The rockbottom, irreducible U.S. aim is that South Viet Nam must be independent. Under every conceivable point of negotiation--provided both sides mean what they say--this U.S. minimum goal conflicts head-on with the Communist demand. Nevertheless, there is considerable interest in the principal topics that could come up at a bargaining table. They add up to six:

1) When to Stop Fighting. Despite the U.S. proposal that "a cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference," high American officials in Saigon and Washington warn that the U.S. should do just the opposite, maintaining and perhaps increasing military pressure until discussions are successfully concluded. In his book, How Communists Negotiate, Admiral C. Turner Joy (ret.), the U.N.'s chief negotiator in Korea, charges that Washington's early agreement to a truce line at the Panmunjom peace talks in 1951 "was the turning point of the armistice conference. Thereafter, we lacked the essential military pressure to enforce a reasonable attitude"--and 70,000 American casualties were sustained under Communist attacks while the talks dragged on for two years. In Viet Nam, warns a top U.S. diplomat in the Far East, to ease up on the battlefield would be "to ensure a loss at the bargaining table." Furthermore, if talks broke down after a ceasefire, it would be difficult to regain the momentum to start the war up again. Some U.S. diplomats also insist that any talks should have a time limit and not be allowed to go on indefinitely, and that a system for supervision and inspection of whatever measures may eventually be agreed on should be nailed down first.

2) Who Participates? In suggesting negotiations a year and a half ago, Charles de Gaulle proposed that talks be carried on by the reconvened 1954 Geneva Conference, which was attended by France, the U.S., Great Britain, Communist China, Russia, Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam. Washington would go along with this, but there has been little indication that such a disparate group would even sit down together today. Moreover, the U.S. is concerned that a large conference might degenerate into a Communist-dominated mob scene that would attempt to stampede Washington into undue concessions. A more important issue is Hanoi's insistence that the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong, be seated as an equal participant. This the U.S. has rejected because it considers the front the pawn of North Viet Nam, and feels that seating it would confer on the subversive organization that the U.S. has been fighting the status of a legitimate political power. However, Washington suggests that the Viet Cong "would not have difficulty having their views represented" if the front attended as part of the North Vietnamese delegation. Says Secretary of State Rusk: "We don't care a bit who sits behind Hanoi's back at a conference table."

3) The Viet Cong's Future. The question of ihe Viet Cong's status at the conference table leads directly to the far larger question of the Viet Cong's future status in the country. Hanoi flatly demands that "the internal affairs of South Viet Nam be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front." The U.S. rejects this, arguing that it would in effect mean handing over South Viet Nam to the Viet Cong and hence to Hanoi. Some critics of U.S. policy disagree, asserting that the Liberation Front is, in large measure, a genuine nationalist movement and would sooner or later be independent of Hanoi. While the front certainly includes many non-Communists and nationalists, every reasonably well-informed source agrees that it is an integral part of Hanoi's Communist apparatus. Communists themselves like to compare the front to the Asian crane--"a big bird with a large white body and a small red head." Since the Viet Cong now hold at least two-thirds of South Viet Nam's territory (though mostly the least populated areas), it is difficult to see how or why they should allow themselves to be excluded from any future political role. On the other hand, the U.S.'s minimal demand for an independent South Viet Nam would be reduced to sham if the Viet Cong were to have a leading role in a future coalition government, which they obviously would seek to subvert and dominate.

4) Elections. The country's political future, says the U.S., should be determined by free elections in South Viet Nam. In genuinely free elections, Washington feels that the Viet Cong would not do nearly so well as thought by some observers who underestimate the genuine anti-Communist sentiment in South Viet Nam. However, free elections are obviously impossible while the Viet Cong retain their arms and their whole apparatus of terror, and before a measure of security, stability and free political life has been restored to the war-torn country. Much the same applies to Hanoi's demand for "the peaceful reunification" of North and South Viet Nam. The U.S. concedes that this "should be determined through free decision" of both peoples--the key phrase being "free decision." The U.S. would want a genuine vote both in the South and in the North (which, of course, has never had a free vote under Communist rule). Hanoi would want a plebiscite engineered and dominated by the Communists.

5) The Presence of U.S. Troops. Hanoi demands the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the dismantling of U.S. military bases. Washington replies that "we want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia" and "do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet Nam"--but adds the essential qualification, "after peace is assured." In other words, the U.S. is perfectly willing to get out of South Viet Nam, but only when and if the country is made really secure--which would obviously take a long time. As a Washington observer explains: "It is not U.S. policy to seek or maintain bases in Southeast Asia merely for the purpose of having such bases. The bases will remain in the area only so long as they are essential for the protection of countries." Hanoi, of course, does not concede that Viet Cong infiltration or subversion is a form of aggression from which South Viet Nam requires protection. An international control commission or peace force to supervise and police a possible settlement has been suggested as a way out, but hardly any serious observers believe that this would work in the long run. The possibility is also being advanced that the U.S. for the time being hold on to the one-third or so of South Viet Nam's territory that the Americans and the Saigon government currently control--the cities and coastal enclaves--and abandon the rest to the Viet Cong until it could be liberated by a U.S.-backed "hidden war," in which U.S. and South Vietnamese troops would wage a quiet guerrilla campaign in reverse, against the Communists. But this, too, would in effect temporarily hand the Viet Cong control of most of the country.

6) Neutralization. There have been various suggestions for a neutralized setup, not in Viet Nam alone but in the whole area--a series of buffer states between Red China and the West. Laos, of course, is formally neutral already, and highly unstable, but currently leaning toward the West. Cambodia is also technically neutral, but leaning heavily toward China. For these countries, and perhaps Burma, a regional neutrality system might make sense from the Western point of view. Thailand, on the other hand, is the most stable country in the area, staunchly anti-Communist and pro-West, and its neutralization might well be unacceptable to its own people. On this, the U.S. position is that "the countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral; the U.S. wants no new allies." But it would have to be true neutrality, meaning genuine independence--and it is virtually impossible to see what military or political force could ensure this.

Washington is not trying to push Ho Chi Minh into an agreement formally admitting defeat. After all, he has not yet been defeated. But for negotiations to yield any real results, the Communists would have to admit tacitly that they cannot force the U.S. out, and thus conclude that they might as well cut their losses under some face-saving formula. Should the Communists ever reach that point, it is entirely possible that it would not lead them to the conference table at all, but that the war would end in a military stalemate and the gradual petering out of guerrilla attacks--as they petered out without ceremony in Greece, the Philippines, Malaya and the Congo.

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