A Triumph for Europe

"Never in the course of our evolution have we taken a decision of such magnitude," beamed Walter Hallstein, the Common Market's usually understated president. "From now on we can only march forward into a European future," exclaimed German Economics Minister Kurt Schmuecker. He was stubble-bearded and blanched with fatigue after two marathon bargaining sessions that had lasted 42 hours. "It's a great, great success, a great political event," said the European Economic Community's farm boss, Sicco Mansholt, his voice breaking with emotion. Then, at 5:30 on a foggy morning in Brussels, the diplomats unabashedly embraced one another.

Halfway Price. The cause for jubilation was an agreement on the Mansholt Plan to create a common market for cereals starting with the 1967 harvest, meaning, as Mansholt explained, "From Schleswig-Holstein to Sicily, we'll have one basic system, one set of rules and prices." Despite their startling success in reducing industrial divisions among themselves in the seven years since the Common Market was founded, the Six until now have had small luck in harmonizing their farm policies--largely because of the disparity between France's low-cost farm efficiency and Germany's cosseted high-cost output. Mansholt proposed an obvious solution: fix wheat, which is the key to the whole farm price scale, roughly halfway between the German and the French prices, at $106.25 per metric ton.

The Germans stalled for over a year, since the price cut would hurt German farm income to the point of putting as many as a million German farmers out of business and seriously endanger the C.D.U. farm-bloc vote in elections next year. But as French grain surpluses mounted, De Gaulle grew impatient, finally announced two months ago that if the wheat-price issue was not resolved by Dec. 15, France would "cease to participate" in the Common Market.

Only ten months ago, the German Bundestag had voted that German wheat prices would not come down until after 1970. In fact. Chancellor Erhard hoped to reform Germany's outmoded agriculture, and wanted to give in anyway; to do so he needed the excuse of pressure from the French and the U.S. (which wants a common farm policy to enable the E.E.C. to negotiate in the Kennedy Round trade talks). As the pressure mounted, the German delegation at Brussels finally surrendered, enabling the Six to meet De Gaulle's deadline.

Neat Paradox. "All's well that ends well," said Erhard cheerily in Bonn after the Brussels accord, despite pained cries that he had capitulated. "It means new hope for all questions of political and economic integration of Europe." Still, the price for Erhard was high: he promised to pay German farmers some $2 billion in extra subsidies between now and 1970 to enable them to adjust to the lower price levels for their produce. That was enough, presumably, to keep the farmers happy at election time next September.

Even De Gaulle joined in the euphoria, as well he might. The agreement, he said, was a "capital step" along the road to political unity, opening "all sorts of possibilities for the construction of Europe"--provided, he added in a dig at the U.S., that Europe acts "by itself and for itself."

Although France stands to benefit most from a common farm policy, the triumph is really Europe's--proving that not all of De Gaulle's adamant positions are wrong, a fact often overlooked by those who automatically hate anything De Gaulle does. Thus far, French interests and Common Market progress have neatly coincided, a paradox De Gaulle well understands and adroitly used in forcing the grain-price accord.

What he perhaps understands less well is that as France grows more and more interdependent economically, his declarations of political and military independence are likely to carry less weight. While France may well emerge as the leader of an integrated Europe, De Gaulle will no longer be able convincingly to threaten a French withdrawal if he does not get his way on a specific matter. As long as only the industrial half of the E.E.C. was forging ahead, full economic union was impossible. With the addition of the agricultural half in 1967, the ties that bind the Six will draw so tight that a future threat to leave the Common Market--by France or any of the Six--will be virtually impossible.

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