Our New Men in Saigon

Throughout the week, visitors streamed into the U.S. embassy in Saigon to bid farewell. Late one afternoon five Buddhist monks, two in saffron-colored robes and three in black, paid their respects, presented a large, framed color photograph as a going-away gift. U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge smiled gratefully, held it up to look at it -- and froze in shock. The picture was of a Buddhist burning himself to death.

Lodge quickly recovered his composure, thanked the monks, returned to his packing chores. He was leaving South Viet Nam after ten months as ambassador--ten months in which monks continued to die in flames of their own setting, in which the government of South Viet Nam had twice been overturned by military coup, in which--through no fault of Lodge's--the U.S.-backed war against the Communist Viet Cong had gone from bad to worse.

In his letter of resignation to President Johnson, Lodge cited only "personal reasons" for wishing to return to the U.S. His wife Emily has, in fact, been ailing, but not seriously, and the compelling cause for Lodge's decision was his desire to participate actively in the presidential campaign of Moderate Republican William Scranton against Conservative Barry Goldwater.

"It was about as tough a decision as I've ever made," Lodge confided to a newsman friend. "What finally tipped the balance was that in the last two or three weeks I've heard from people in whom I have a good deal of faith and confidence that my returning to the U.S. could make a significant difference in the prospects for Scranton's nomination. I felt a tremendous responsibility in this matter. I even felt the pressure here in Viet Nam. One afternoon I ran into a young Army captain, and he asked, 'Sir, are you going home to help Scranton?', and when I said I was not, all he said was 'Oh,' but the tone of his voice made me feel like a slacker. A few days later I decided I had to do it."

"Make No Mistake." To replace Lodge in Saigon, President Johnson named none other than the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, thereby setting off a round of musical chairs in the Penta gon's military command (see box next page). In appointing Taylor, the President demonstrated the premium his Administration places on having a big-name ambassador in South Viet Nama premium so high that in recent weeks Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, all anticipating Lodge's resignation, offered to resign their present jobs and take over the Saigon post.

In an unusual move, the President also picked a top-level assistant for Taylor: he gave the rarely used title of deputy ambassador to U. (for Ural) Alexis Johnson, 55, who had been serving as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the State Department's fourth highest post.

The immediate and widespread assumption was that Taylor wou'd be sort of an ambassador in charge of military matters, while Alexis Johnson, a tough, unflappable State Department veteran who once served as Ambassador to Thailand and is considered an expert on Southeast Asia, would run the diplomatic shop. But this, insisted State Department officials, was a false assumption. "Make no mistake," said one, "Taylor is going out there as the ambassador and Johnson is No. 2 man. Taylor will have the responsibility and control over the entire bag of worms." Still, Taylor is 62, has long been looking forward to retirement and is not expected to stay in Saigon for long. He certainly will do so until past the U.S.'s November elections, after which Alexis Johnson presumably will take over.

Another widespread assumption was that Taylor's appointment meant an intensification and expansion of the U.S. war effort in Southeast Asia. This feel ing seemed to be shared by South Viet Nam's Premier Nguyen Khanh, who welcomed Taylor as "a wonderful soldier" and proclaimed: "Things are going to happen fast and hard in the fight for freedom in the South and liberation of the North." Adding to the impression that the U.S. was about to step up the struggle against Communism in Southeast Asia was the arrival in Thai land of five U.S. supply ships.

Such impressions to the contrary, there is no present intention that Taylor's assignment means a change in policy--a fact President Johnson was careful to point out in announcing Taylor's appointment. Said he: "The United States intends no rashness and seeks no wider war." Max Taylor himself, both as a special military adviser to President John Kennedy and as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was a major architect of present U.S. policies in Southeast Asia and has long argued against any massive commitment of U.S. ground troops in Asia.

Unfortunate Interview. There are several considerations against "escalating" the fight in Southeast Asia--and not the least of them is political. This is an election year in the U.S., and the last thing in the world that President Johnson wants before November is a costlier, bloodier war in Southeast Asia. He would indeed be understandably delighted if Southeast Asia were not even mentioned during the campaign.

In this sentiment Johnson last week got concurrence from retiring Ambassador Lodge. Said he, in an unfortunate Saigon interview: "I don't see how Viet Nam can be a part of this campaign. It involves the Eisenhower Administration and the Kennedy and Johnson Administration and the Truman Administration. As a matter of fact, foreign policy often is not a good subject for politics. In history, when you've had a disaster, then that becomes a political issue, even if the politicians do not do anything about it. But happily, in the case of South Viet Nam, there's no prospect for a disaster of that kind at this time."

Back home, Lodge's fellow Republicans shuddered. Said Bill Scranton, the man whom Lodge was returning to the U.S. to help: "The Vietnamese war is an issue. Anything that has to do with our foreign policy or defense is an issue." Cried Barry Goldwater: "Surely Lodge cannot believe that such questions can be evaded simply by pretending they do not exist. That is precisely what this Administration has been doing, and I hope that no Republican will support such an evasion." Wisconsin's Republican Representative Melvin Laird, chairman of the G.O.P. platform committee for the party's national convention, said his group certainly would not feel inhibited about criticizing the Administration's Southeast Asia policy because of Lodge's involvement. Said Laird of Lodge: "He was President Kennedy's and President Johnson's ambassador, not ours."

Out of the Crucible. At week's end, in a farewell press conference, Lodge backed off slightly from his earlier statement, conceded: "In a campaign you have a right to discuss any public question you want. What I meant to say was that it was not always a practicable thing to do. I don't see much partisan advantage for anybody in this situation here, since members of both parties have taken part in it."

The fact is that Southeast Asia will be a major campaign issue, no matter whom the Republicans name as their candidate. And that is just as it should be. For out of the crucible of responsible political criticism may come a far more effective national policy toward Southeast Asia than any the U.S. has achieved so far.

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