The Cold Slap

President Charles de Gaulle last week detonated a political bomb that scattered fallout from the Formosa Strait to Washington's Foggy Bottom. The blockbuster: France will "soon" recognize Red China.

The U.S. got the word twice on the same day. In Paris, U.S. Ambassador Charles Bohlen was called to the Quai d'Orsay and informed of France's intention. In Washington, dapper French Ambassador Herve Alphand gave the cold slap to Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman. The French government, said Alphand, considered it necessary "to fill the void" left by the Sino-Soviet dispute by accepting "the reality" of China.

Fragile Balance. U.S. policymakers bounced like popcorn on a hot stove. Many viewed De Gaulle's arbitrary action, undertaken without consulting his NATO allies, as simply a cheap way for France to demonstrate its independence in foreign affairs. Washington maintains that the French move is both mischievous and unwise because 1) it will not soften Red China's militancy or even necessarily help trade (the Dutch have formal trade relations with China, but sell less there than do the Belgians, who have none); 2) it upsets the "very fragile balance" in the Far East and can have incalculable repercussions around the Chinese perimeter; 3) it creates an "acute" situation in the United Nations, since the additional votes of France, the French African states and, perhaps, Canada and Belgium may result in a seat for China's Communists next fall.

De Gaulle's spokesmen explain that he feels the West should face up to the reality that "China exists," and take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and the emergence of an independent China policy to open an avenue of contact with the vast human and geographic mass that China represents. Embittered U.S. officials grumbled that De Gaulle has completely overlooked the fact that the U.S. has paid and is still paying to keep troops in South Korea facing the Communist threat, is financing the Chinese Nationalist military effort on Formosa, and is currently engaged in a fighting war with Communism in South Viet Nam.

Urgent Call. The next question was whether France could keep its diplomatic relations with "both Chinas." Paris seemed willing to do so, and Red China might well go along. Faced with the "incredible" reports of De Gaulle's action, a special policy committee of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang party scheduled an emergency session. On the basis of precedent, Formosa seemed to have no alternative but to sever relations with France.

For the U.S., the problem is even more complex. Washington must weigh De Gaulle's intransigence against his proven faithfulness as an ally in such moments of crisis as the confrontation with Khrushchev over the missiles in Cuba. What the situation seemed to call for urgently was a personal meeting between Charles de Gaulle and Lyndon Johnson for an examination in depth of Franco-American differences. De Gaulle's move toward recognition of Red China is simply one more in a long list of policy conflicts, and it is unlikely that relations will improve without a dialogue between the Presidents.

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