The Care & Feeding of Generals

In other lands, the assurance might have been regarded as unnecessary--or impertinent. But in Venezuela it mattered. As outgoing President Romulo Betancourt and President-elect Raul Leoni reviewed an air force anniversary parade recently, Colonel Francisco Miliani Aranguren, the air force commander, stepped forward. The military, promised Aranguren, "will remain loyal to the 3,000,000 compatriots who went to the polls to choose our next President."

In the past 21 months, six constitutionally chosen Presidents have been deposed in Latin America by the armed forces.* A military tolerance of a democratic regime is especially remarkable in Venezuela. During Venezuela's 133 years as a republic, no constitutional President has ever completed his term, and 16 out of 24 Presidents have been generals. Venezuela's favorite sports, goes the Caracas joke, are bolas, cana y golpes--rumors, rum and military coups.

Polishing Brass. Venezuela's tigers may be changing their stripes. In his nearly five years in office, Betancourt has become that most unusual of Latin American politicians: a moderate leftist who gets along with the conservative colonels and generals. With luck, his successor, Leoni, should be able to continue the arrangement.

Betancourt learned his lesson when he first came to power in 1945, as provisional President after a coup by junior officers. He tried to ram through drastic economic and social reforms, but his successor paid too little attention to the military. Within three years, his Action Democratica party was turned out by another coup that led to the brutal, ten-year rule of Dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez, a general. His next chance at office, Betancourt went all out to convince the small (33,000 men) but powerful armed forces that they had nothing to fear from democracy.

In his inauguration speech, Betancourt promised that no Communists would be allowed in his government. He held the military to 10% of Venezuela's budget, yet still managed to buy new arms and jet trainers. Officers were promoted on merit, not a dictator's whim. Military personnel were extended easy credit for off-post housing. On trips to the backlands, Betancourt called first on local garrisons. He visited army engineers on remote road-building projects, dropped in for Christmas caroling with the troops, and always had time for a little brass polishing at regimental anniversary celebrations.

Golden Exile. For safety's sake, Betancourt cleaned out the worst of the golpistas. But he was discreet about it. Many a coup-minded officer was quietly "retired" with pay, or shipped off to "golden exile" in a diplomatic post. To other officers, Betancourt preached the sermon: "Your only party is Venezuela." The armed forces had a "patriotic duty" to help make democracy work.

Furthermore, Betancourt took his military chiefs into his political confidence. They were consulted on opposition to Castro, petroleum policy and other executive decisions. When his regime was subjected to terrorist attacks and a rightist assassination plot, the armed forces backed him all the way. The military's finest hour came in the 1962 uprising of a small group of marines and Red-led civilians at the Puerto Cabello naval base. The air force mounted blazing air attacks, and loyal troops crushed the rebels in vicious street fighting that cost 300 casualties.

Will of the Majority. Last February, 400 officers stood on the Maiquetia airport tarmac to see Betancourt off on a trip to visit President Kennedy in Washington. Ignoring protocol, Betancourt shook hands with one and all. On his return, he told 1,200 officers all about the trip. Last month, when Castroite terrorists tried to wreck the presidential election, Defense Minister General Antonio Briceno Linares went on radio and TV with an election-eve speech: "There will be no disorder, there will be no civil war. Only the will of the majority of Venezuelans will exist." And to convince the terrorists, the military brought in 25,000 troops.

President-elect Leoni lacks Betancourt's fiery personal appeal, but he is an old and shrewd politician who should know a successful campaign when he sees one. He starts out with promises of loyalty from a younger, better educated, more politically sophisticated and more professional army. Whether he keeps the loyalty depends on his success as President. In the old golpista tradition, many officers still consider it their duty, as ultimate guardians of their country, to remove a President who fails.

* Argentina's Arturo Frondizi, Peru's Manuel Prado, Guatemala's Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, Ecuador's Carlos Arosemena, Dominican Republic's Juan Bosch, Honduras' Ramen Villeda Morales.

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