An Admiral's Epilogue

Only the day before, Admiral George W. Anderson had been sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal. Soon he would be off for Lisbon--where, presumably, he would no longer voice the dissenting defense-policy views that had caused the Kennedy Administration to drop him as Chief of Naval Operations. But before he left, Anderson had a few parting words about working for Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

Anderson appeared before the National Press Club in Washington to deliver "an epilogue to my military career." He insisted that "I question neither motivation, patriotism, dedication or ability of anyone." What he did question was the system imposed on the Defense Department by McNamara. Said Anderson: "Overcentralized structures are conducive to the abuse of power and compounding of mistakes. Monolithic-structured organizations can kill imagination, stultify initiative, completely eliminate the effectiveness of those in the officer corps who have gained wisdom and experience."

A Modern Fallacy. Anderson was "disturbed because now, in the Department of Defense, the operations analyst--properly concerned with 'cost effectiveness'--seems to be working at the wrong echelon: above the professional military level rather than in an advisory capacity to the military, who should thoroughly appreciate his assistance. Unfortunately, an unhealthy imbalance has resulted because at times specialists are used as experts in areas outside their fields. This has resulted in a tendency to draw conclusions before all the evidence has been examined."

Anderson assailed the "modern fallacy that theories, or computers, or economics, or numbers of weapons win wars. Alone, they do not. Man, his wits and his will are still the key to war and peace, victory and defeat. Morale is the business of every leader in our defense establishment. Do all else right, and do this wrong--the product in a crisis is disaster."

When the Chips Are Down. Citing McNamara's rejection of the recommendations in two aircraft contracts--the TFX and the V/STOL--Anderson said that "military experience builds an appreciation of the truth that slight margins make big differences when the chips are down. Those who fought in the Pacific know what the narrow margin of operational superiority in the Japanese Zero fighter cost in American lives. I have had two nephews--both Navy pilots--who have been lost in peacetime in naval aircraft. We feel emotionally aroused as well as dispassionately concerned if the recommendations of the uniformed chiefs of our services, each backed up by competent military and civilian professional staffs, are altered or overruled without interim consultation, explanation and discussion."

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