Where the Answer Lies

In addition to Secretary McNamara, those testifying last week before the Senate committeemen on behalf of the test ban treaty were: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn Seaborg, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell Taylor, and Central Intelligence Agency Director John McCone. The case they made was convincing--even though it did not relieve some Senators' doubts.

Another Step. Rusk led off. Some people, he said quietly, might wonder why three successive U.S. Administrations have exerted so much effort trying to reach a nuclear test ban agreement, even while accumulating stockpiles of nuclear weapons. "The answer," said Rusk, "lies at the heart of the dilemma which troubles our world. The values that are the heritage of a free society have been menaced by a Communist bloc armed with the most modern weapons and intent on world domination."

The proposed treaty, Rusk admitted, left many perilous cold war conflicts still at issue. But it might--just might --be the beginning of an end to the nuclear armaments race. Said Rusk: "For 17 years all men have lived in the shadow of fear. But if the promise of this treaty can be realized, if we can now take even this one step along a new course, then frail and fearful mankind may find another step and another, until confidence replaces terror and hope takes over from despair."

Like McNamara, who followed him, Rusk vowed that the U.S. will remain vigilant against the possibility of Soviet duplicity. Said he: "We shall be on the alert for any violations, and we have a high degree of confidence in our ability to detect them." In fact, Rusk went out of his way to assure the Senators that the Administration is not so naive as to think the treaty is based on mutual trust. "I don't believe that an agreement of this sort can rest upon the elements of faith and trust. The Soviet Union does not trust the United States. We do not trust the Soviet Union."

Another Pressure. In order, Seaborg, Taylor and McCone backed up the Rusk-McNamara argument that the treaty is in the best 'interests of the U.S. The Senate committeemen had been particularly anxious to hear Taylor. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff, professional military men less interested in diplomatic advances than in U.S. might, support the test ban? Yes, said Taylor, they did. But some Senators were still concerned lest the Joint Chiefs had come to that decision not out of conviction but under pressure from the civilians of the Kennedy Administration. That fret was expressed in an exchange between Georgia's Democratic Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Taylor:

Russell: Now, we hear a good deal in this day and time about pressures that are brought to bear on the Joint Chiefs to cause them to surrender purely military views to what might be called political considerations of one kind or another . . . Have any unusual pressures been brought to bear on you or any other members of the Joint Chiefs to your knowledge in consideration of this treaty?

Taylor: Not in the sense that you suggest, Senator Russell. Obviously, we are always under pressure of various sorts. We have the pressures of our services, we have the pressures of our conscience, we have the pressures of our duty to our country. Many vectors are constantly bearing on the Chiefs of Staff.

Russell: I am aware of those. We have some of those on the Hill, and we also have some of the so-called arm-twisting kind ... I was referring to the arm-twisting kind by superiors.

Taylor: No, sir; definitely not.

Taylor did, however, make clear that the Joint Chiefs supported the treaty only if it were implemented by "adequate safeguards." These were: 1) continuance of "comprehensive and aggressive" U.S. underground testing;2) maintenance of "modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs" to keep U.S. nuclear technology moving even during the treaty's lifetime; 3) readiness to promptly resume atmospheric testing if the Soviets violate the agreement; and 4) work toward improving U.S. capability of detecting covert atmospheric tests.

Another Treaty. The necessity for these safeguards had also been weighing heavily on the mind of Washington's Democratic Senator Henry ("Scoop") Jackson, a member of both the Senate Armed Services and Joint Atomic Energy committees. Jackson, one of the Senate's most knowledgeable and influential authorities on nuclear defense policy, had earlier indicated the possibility that he might vote against the treaty. Even now, he wanted to see Taylor's assurances in writing. He submitted a resolution, which the Armed Services committeemen speedily adopted, that would require the Joint Chiefs to present in print their specific requirements for carrying out the safeguards. These, he insisted, were "part and parcel of the Senate's ability to vote intelligently" on the treaty.

In all probability, Jackson will wind up voting for the treaty. So, almost certainly, will the two-thirds of the Senate that the treaty needs for ratification. But before then, the Senators plainly intend to keep right on asking questions that can, in the long run, be only of benefit to the U.S.

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