The Camel Driver

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At 6:30 one morning early this month, a phone shrilled in the small office off the bedroom of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Already awake, he lifted the receiver to hear exciting news: a military coup had just been launched against the anti-Nasser government of Syria. The phone rang again. It was the Minister of Culture and National Guidance. How should Radio Cairo handle the Syrian crisis? Support the rebels, snapped Nasser.

Then Egypt's boss rapped out a succession of telephoned commands. To the air force: alert the bombers and fighters in case the Syrian rebels call for help. To the navy (six destroyers and ten submarines): steam northward and await orders. To the army: prepare to move in case the Israelis might be thinking of intervention; place missiles on launch pads ready to fire.

This done, Nasser finished dressing and went downstairs. The phone rang again, long distance from Baghdad. President Abdul Salam Aref, who only four weeks before had overthrown another anti-Nasser regime in Iraq, solicitously asked what Nasser intended doing about Syria. Nasser said that he would recognize a rebel government as soon as it was formed. Aref delicately responded that of course. Egypt should be the first state to grant recognition, promised that Iraq would follow suit five minutes later.

Limb from Limb. Since the Syrian coup was both swift and successful, Nasser's nerves and the Egyptian army were not put to the test. Israel alerted its border defenses but made no further move. On the surface, in fact, the Syrian affair was much milder and less bloody than most Arab revolts. In the past 15 years, the Middle East has been continually shaken like a kaleidoscope, constantly falling into new patterns. There have been two sizable wars and fully two dozen armed uprisings and rebellions. Premiers and princes have been torn limb from limb by street mobs; thousands of politicians and army officers have been killed by hanging, beheading, firing squads and assassins; and swarms of students, workers and tribesmen have been mowed down by machine guns and bombs.

It was quite clear last week that the latest shake of the kaleidoscope resulted in new patterns and alignments overwhelmingly favorable to Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Syrian revolution was the third in six months by rebels pledged to make common cause with Egypt. Flights of new leaders poured into Cairo for tear-stained embraces with Nasser and nightlong conferences on the future course of that misty concept called Arab unity. Nasser stands at the pinnacle of prestige, if not of power, and the shadow he casts has never been longer. Today, it falls over the entire Arab world from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean.

Matter of Sabotage? For the first time in 500 years, the three key Arab states of Egypt, Iraq and Syria have a similar political posture and are on close and friendly terms. The new crowd in primitive Yemen, where 28,000 Egyptian troops are propping up still another pro-Nasser rebellion, is eager to join any alliance that can be hammered out. The monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan--close friends of the West but hated enemies of the Arab nationalists--face the threat of uprisings at the hands of powerful local friends of the man in Cairo. When King Saud's private Comet plane, equipped with a royal throne, crashed last week against an Italian mountain, killing all 18 aboard, the Saudi Arabs automatically assumed that it had been sabotaged by Nasser agents.

Maybe it was and maybe it was not. In the swirling Middle East struggle, Cairo would flex its muscles where it could. The successful coups in Yemen, Syria and Iraq were no surprise to Gamal Abdel Nasser. He knew they were coming, if not precisely when and how. He knew the conspirators involved in each, though he claims to have pulled no strings. Cairo is thickly populated by exiles from every corner of the Arab world, ranging from Syria's tough Abdul Hamid Serraj, who originally failed Nasser in Damascus, to obscure Tunisians, Yemenis, Saudis, Jordanians and refugees from the British-backed sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. Many of them live well on Egyptian subsidies. Former Saudi Petroleum Minister

Abdullah Tariki is in and out of Cairo frequently, helping organize arms shipments to Saudi Arabian dissidents by air and across the long, empty border with Kuwait. Nasser has won over Saudi Ara bia's Ambassador to West Germany, who resigned a fortnight ago in protest at his country's failure to institute reforms. At least six other Saudi ambassadors are sympathetic to Nasser's cause.

Accented Voice. All the Arab world is influenced by Nasser's genius as a propagandist. Rising to share Cairo's skyline with the huge dome of the Mohammed Ali mosque is a forest of transmitting antennas that carry Radio Cairo's message to all the world. Cairo's voice bears many accents. There is the overt Voice of the Arabs, and a whole concatenation of '"Voices" (Voice of the Arab Nation, Free Voice of Iran, Voice of Free Africa, etc.), which bleat incitement to rebellion with no identification of their Egyptian origin. The transmitting complex is elaborate and devilishly clever. Recently, Somali-language transmissions have supported the claims of Somalia to a portion of northeast Kenya, while Swahili broadcasts aimed at Kenya denounce the idea. A U.S. construction firm is building a new transmitter, which will be beamed at Tunisia and aimed at destroying President Habib Bourguiba.

Egyptian TV, the liveliest in the Middle East, manages to keep three channels busy 20 hours a day, while kinescopes subtly loaded with Nasser propaganda are shipped out to Algeria, Kuwait and Lebanon. Nasser has collected the best entertainers in the Arab world, and uses them superbly. When Um Kalsoum sings We Revolutionists, the Bedouins in the desert are deeply stirred. One of the most popular songs among Arab kids is How We Build the High Dam at Aswan. Every transistor radio in the Middle East is a Nasser agent. When Yemen revolted against the Imam, Nasser sent them arms and transistors. Arab Communists who broadcast long, windy speeches from Bulgaria have not a chance against Nasser's entertainers.

Fire Striker. But Nasser's triumphs are not solely the result of subversion and pop singers. His very example is an inspiration. He has been the uncontested ruler of Egypt for almost a decade, ever since February 1954, when he put down a revolt of cavalry officers and consolidated his regime. During that time, the old political remnants such as the Wafdists have disappeared and even been forgotten. It is Nasser whose personality stands above all others in Egypt and the Arab world, and no other name strikes fire like his.

He is hailed as the man who destroyed Egypt's corrupt past and gave Arabs a new dignity. His picture, with its Pepsodent smile, is found in every corner of the Middle East, from Iraqi bazaars to the huts of royalist Yemeni tribesmen who still cling to Nasser's picture even though they are fighting Nasser's troops.

What Nasser has working for him is the deep desire of all Arabs to be united in a single Arab nation, and their conviction--grudging or enthusiastic--that Nasser represents the best hope of achieving it. This dream of unity harks back to the golden age of the 7th century when, spurred by the messianic Moslem religion handed down by Mohammed the Prophet. Arab warriors burst from their desert peninsula and conquered everything in sight. In less than 150 years, the Arabs swept victoriously north to Asia Minor and the walls of Byzantine Constantinople, south over Persia and Afghanistan to the heart of India, east through Central Asia to the borders of China, west over Egypt and Africa to Spain and southern France. It was an incredible empire--larger than any carved out by Alexander the Great or Imperial Rome.

It was also an empire that fell swiftly apart. By the 16th century, the Arab states, one by one, fell to the Ottomans and passed into the long sleep of Turkish domination. Then, in World War I, Arab nationalists rebelled against their Turkish overlords and fought beside the British armies in the Middle East, confident that they would obtain unity and freedom. Moviegoers who have seen Lawrence of Arabia know the gloomy result: under League of Nation mandates, most of the Middle East was handed over to Britain and France, and frustrated Arabs wasted themselves in futile rebellions against the colonial powers. World War II did little better for the Arab nationalists. Individual states gained independence, but control was securely held by feudal monarchs or coalitions of landowners and business men who were often little more than colonial puppets. Sir Winston Churchill "invented" the state of Jordan "on a Sunday afternoon in Jerusalem." Even worse, in the Arab view, was the partition of Palestine to provide a national homeland for the Jews. Humiliation became complete in 1948, when the combined armies of the Arab countries were crushingly defeated by the Israelis.

Moon Orbit. Hence the enormous prestige Nasser won in 1956, when he survived the massed assault of Britain, France and Israel in the Suez War. Arabs ignored the fact that the Egyptians were beaten in the field and that only intervention by the U.S. and the Soviet Union saved Nasser from collapse. What mattered was that Nasser had engaged the imperialists and Israel in battle, and managed to survive. When Egypt later proved that it had the technical skill to operate the Suez Canal efficiently on its own. Arab nationalists were as proud as if Nasser had personally orbited the moon.

His Arab brethren also share pride in Nasser's achievements at home in the years since Suez. Cairo, a city as populous as Chicago, has become a bustling, busy metropolis. New skyscrapers line the banks of the Nile, throwing glittering light on the river at night and by day reflecting in their glass walls the stately grace of the sails of feluccas headed upriver with cargoes of wheat and lime.

The building boom is not confined to the hotels, which were host this winter to a record half-million tourists. On the edge of the city, entire new suburbs are in being or abuilding. At Medinet el Waqf, Egypt's new managers are housed in modern stucco cottages. On the northern rim of the city, 40,000 low-cost housing units were erected last year.

But most of Cairo remains the same: close, crowded and cacophonous with hard-pressed auto horns. In Imbaba, on the west bank of the Nile, camels streaked with henna still plod unknowingly toward the slaughterhouse, and gully-gully men delight bright-eyed, brown-faced children with magic tricks as they did their grandfathers 50 years ago. Imbaba's junk market is still unchanged, and bent nails and half-shoelaces are traded with solemnity and diligence. The red flowerpot of the tarboosh has all but vanished from Cairenes' heads, and Nasser has even made considerable progress in his campaign to get his city folk to switch to European clothes from the nightshirt-like galabiya. Most astonishing is the fact that a visitor seldom sees a barefoot man, woman or child. Even urchins from the Cairo slums wear shoes--and socks. Today Cairo walks well-dressed, well-shod and bareheaded, with its shoulders back.

Swallowed Revenues. Of all Egyptians, the industrial worker has fared the best under Nasser. Next to him comes the fellah, the timeless peasant working the timeless land. It was the jest of 1952 that Nasser's foremost ambition was to raise the fellahin at least to the living standard of the gamoosa, the water buffalo of the Nile. He has more than succeeded. You can see it simply in the fellah's clothes. But also the fellah, who used to have meat only once or twice a year, now eats it at least once a week.

In pre-Nasser Egypt, the most common characteristic of the fellahin was summed up in the phrase anna mail, which roughly translates, "I couldn't care less." Today the word heard over and over is nahdha, a term meaning to sit up and take notice of the world around you. Egypt has been awake, taking notice and participating since the hot summer morning in July 1952, when Nasser and a group of young army officers put an end to the regime of King Farouk.

The resulting economic upsurge was hardly accomplished by Egypt alone. The intense development campaign swallowed up revenues from the Suez Canal, and from the biggest crop, cotton. In the process, the nation has spent its savings. Egypt's foreign-exchange reserves, which stood at a billion dollars after World War II, have dwindled to scarcely $10 million. The consequence is an increasing dependence on foreign aid. The Communist bloc has committed itself to $700 million in economic aid since 1955, and Russia is footing the bill for the famed High Dam at Aswan, which by 1972 will increase the arable land of Egypt from 6,000,000 acres to 8,000,000 acres and supply 10 billion kw-h in electric power. Since 1945, the U.S. has supplied Egypt with $628.6 million, mostly in the form of surplus food paid for in Egyptian pounds, 85% of which can be (and is) loaned back to Egypt. Today, Egypt is dependent on the U.S. for its food, and on Russia for its arms and the Aswan Dam.

The fact is that Nasser is not totally dependent on any one power or group of powers. He is still determinedly nonaligned. But things are better than the word implies. A few years ago, Nasser was nonaligned toward the East; today, he is more accurately regarded as non-aligned toward the West.

Happy Nausea. But Nasser's one-man rule has not brought unmitigated bliss to Egypt. The banks and insurance companies were nationalized, and their owners paid off partly in bonds that may not be redeemed for years to come. Contractors whose earnings reach $69,000 a year are taken over, or forced to accept joint participation by the government. Wiped out are the great landowners; farm holdings are now limited to 100 acres per family. This form of socialism is benign enough. It leaves most of the nation's commerce in private hands and does not affect the overwhelming number of small farmers, who own far less than 100 acres.

The press was nationalized in 1960, and its editors are picked by the regime; they, of course, do not criticize Nasser's policies. Political activity in the usual sense is banned because, as Nasser puts it, "if I had three political parties, one would be run by the rich, one by the Soviets, and one by the U.S." The only party permitted by law is the official Arab

Socialist Union, which is supposed to provide democracy by its representation in every village, factory and urban district. There, leaders are chosen to pass local views along to provincial and national committees.

Nasser's revolution has never been particularly totalitarian, but there was a nasty period in late 1961, when Syria broke away from Egypt. Hundreds of people, including army officers, were arrested. Foreign diplomats were shadowed by secret police. But since then, the atmosphere of fear has largely vanished. General Mohammed Naguib. the 1952 revolution's first leader, who served for two years as a front for Nasser and was then deposed, still lives quietly in a Cairo villa near the Nile and is permitted to move fairly freely about the city. Old Nahas Pasha and other former Wafdist enemies of the new regime remain in their homes, which, in most cases, they have been allowed to keep.

Nasser's government has moved impressively into the fields of education and health. Primary schools were erected and staffed at a rate of two every three days. Education is free, and Egypt's universities are crammed with 126,000 students, including 20,000 from other Arab lands. Improved hygiene and free clinics have only increased the population pressure: the new arable land to be provided by the Aswan Dam will be barely enough to feed the estimated 55 million population in 20 years. In short, at tremendous cost, Egypt will not have gone forward but merely stood still. Faced with this challenge, Nasser has begun a nationwide birth control campaign. Oral contraceptives are being sold below cost (a month's supply for 46-c-), and Egyptian women are said to relish the pills because they induce the same feeling of nausea experienced in pregnancy.

The pressure of Egypt's millions, in fact, is one of the things that makes other Arab states wary of being too closely embraced by Nasser. Egypt, like China, is always threatening to spill over its borders into the relatively empty land of its neighbors. Individualistic Arabs, as well, are nervously concerned about disappearing into the straitjacket of Nasser's one-man rule.

Laps of Generals. To these dissenters, there is another flashing beacon of Arab unity: the Baath (Renaissance) Party, which dominates the new governments in both Iraq and Syria. The street mobs and impatient young army officers may worship Nasser, but Arab students and intellectuals bow before the creator of Baath, a tiny, beak-nosed, meek-chinned Syrian named Michel Aflak.

Aflak, 53, an Arab Christian who counts his amber worry beads three at a time, shuns crowds and holds no post in any government, makes an incongruous rival to the brash, burly, good-looking Nasser. No crowds have ever shrieked over him, chanted his name or paraded his picture. He lives in a small, cramped Damascus apartment with a frayed carpet, cheap furniture, and clothes drying on a balcony washline. His two infant children toddle about and, last week, clambered on the laps of generals and Cabinet ministers who crowded Aflak's parlor.

The son of a nationalist-minded shopkeeper, Aflak passionately embraced the ideal of Arab unity as a Damascus schoolboy. His education at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he graduated with honors in history, was financed by a successful uncle who had emigrated to Brazil. After a brief teaching career at a Damascus lycee, Aflak resigned in 1942 to devote his life to politics and to his personal creation, the Baath Party.

What Aflak created was a mystic and lyrical hymn to Wahadi Arablya (Arab oneness), and he overflows with such sentiments as "Nationalism is love before everything else," and "A new page is open, the page of those who walk with naked souls as if they were in their own bedroom." He defines revolution as "that powerful psychic current, that mandatory struggle, without which the reawakening of a nation cannot be understood." The Baath slogan, "Unity. Freedom, Socialism," was blandly appropriated by Nasser for his own use, but Nasser has shown no eagerness to take over other Baath tenets, such as free elections, free press, and freedom of speech and assembly.

From Syria. Baathism moved swiftly to Iraq and Jordan, more slowly to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Although the party is antibourgeois, most of its adherents come from middle-class intellectuals and small shopkeepers. Baath made conservative governments nervous with its socialism (which is actually a blend of mild Marxism and the New Deal), and was attacked by the Communists as a deviating exponent of weak liberalism. In Syria, during the course of 14 years and nine different coups, the Baath Party bobbed up and down. Not until 1958, when Syria's Communists were plotting an armed takeover, were the Baathists able to stampede Syrian conservatives into accepting unity with Egypt as the lesser evil.

Slipped Border. Unity was obtained, but at a high price. Once in control, Nasser insisted on the abolition of all parties, Baath included, and fixed on Syria the same tight controls and security-police system as in Egypt. Designated as the Northern Region of the United Arab Republic. Syria was flooded by officious Egyptian brass and cramped by Nasser's authoritarian economic schemes. Syrian officers who protested found themselves transferred to duty deep in Egypt; civilians quickly landed in jail. At last, even Michel Aflak rebelled and ordered the Baath Cabinet Ministers to resign in a body, setting the stage for Syria's angry secession from the U.A.R.

In Iraq the Baath Party faced crisis from the moment Dictator Karim Kassem established his bloody dictatorship in 1958. The Baathists participated in an armed revolt in the oil center of Mosul, which Kassem savagely suppressed with the help of Iraq's Communist militia. A Baathist group tried to kill Kassem, but failed and was butchered. Finally, last month, Baathist politicians and pro-Nasser military men organized and exe cuted the coup that resulted in the death of Kassem and the slaughter of hundreds of his Communist allies. Four weeks later, with far less blood. Baathists and pro-Nasser officers in Damascus brushed aside the conservative government of Syria. The way at last was open for the unity that everyone had been talking about.

Complete Lesson. The difficulty, of course, is that everyone wants unity on his own terms. Even Jordan's King Hussein, who is anathema to Nasser and the Baathists, says he hopes for eventual reconciliation with his enemies and admission of Jordan into the Arab Union. If necessary. Hussein told newsmen, he would abdicate to achieve Arab unity. But he quickly added. "Provided it's unity on a proper basis." Michel Aflak replies: "Jordan and Saudi Arabia are welcome to join the Arab Union, but not with their present regimes and rulers."

In Cairo President Nasser has given every indication that he intends to avoid the mistakes made during the hurried and ill-fated union with Syria. "The main reason for the lack of success." Nasser told TIME last week, "was that we accepted complete union and amalgamation, instead of federation and self-government in both states."

To begin discussion of a better system. Iraqi and Syrian delegations flew into Cairo fortnight ago for preliminary talks with Nasser. Last week an even more high-powered group of Syrians arrived, headed by Michel Aflak and Premier Salah El-Bitar, with the intention of laying down a solid foundation for the proposed unity structure. This week another set of delegates from Syria and Iraq will return to Cairo, each bringing a draft project for a new union.

Noise in Aleppo. It seems unlikely that any kind of federation with centralized authority will emerge. What is possible is a loose alliance, with harmonized defense and foreign policies. There might also be a degree of economic cooperation among the three nations, possibly including even Yemen, which is so backward that it has been described as "rushing into the 13th century." Such a system of sovereign states would represent a tacit admission that Arabs are not all alike and that their interests do not always coincide. The fact that the talks between Syrians, Iraqis and Egyptians have not yet produced anything concrete is less important than the fact that they are, at least, talking to one another and not screaming imprecations as they have done so often in the past.

But already some Arabs were becoming impatient. There were pro-Nasser demonstrations in the Syrian port of Aleppo. In Damascus a tough young Nasserite who had moved directly from a prison cell to an ornate government office dismissed the Baathists as ideologists, not political leaders. "We are going to run Syria with Nasser the way we want," he said. "We are going to unite with Egypt the way Nasser wants."

Blasting Paths? The fact that the Middle East is so consistently combustible and has so low an ignition point makes its affairs of deep importance to other powers. In the old city of Jerusalem last week, Arabs were jarred by recurrent dull explosions in the border areas, and there was speculation that Israeli demolition squads were blowing up old mines in no man's land to clear lanes for an advance into Jordan should King Hussein be overthrown by Nasserites.

Israel is not impressed by suggestions that Egypt's ruler has given up his domineering ways. One official in Tel Aviv warned: "Nasser finds it difficult to resist temptation. Success turns his head, and being basically a military man, he thinks in terms of external expansion." The Israeli government sees a hint of Nasser's dreams of grandeur in his Yemen adventure, which has already tied up one-third of his army. Israel's stated policy is that any change in the internal situation of her Arab neighbors affecting the security of her borders would free Israel of her under taking to maintain the status quo. Many Arabs fear that Israel would move troops straight to the west bank of the Jordan River if Hussein's regime collapses.

Fat or Thin. Britain's present relations with Egypt are correct but cool. While recognizing Nasser's pre-eminence in the Arab world and his great abilities, the British remain wary of the man and his policies. Understandably, Britain is worried about the future of its few remaining Middle East colonies and its important oil interests. "Nasser's own stand on oil is ambiguous," complains one diplomat. "Of course, he would like to control oil-rich Kuwait, but so would everyone else."

British and U.S. oil executives, though admitting to some uneasiness about Nasser's intentions, see no immediate threat to the Middle East's daily flow of 6,500,000 bbl. "We have learned to live with political instability." says one oilman stoically. Their fear is not that the West will lose access to the Middle East's proven oil reserves of 194 billion bbl., but that any new Arab grouping might start a campaign to reduce the producer's profits. "Arab unity may be good or bad for the oil industry," explained one official. "It depends on the goals of unity--and these are difficult to discern in the present situation."

Drawn Line. Sharply hostile after Nasser's Suez nationalization, and nervous at his flirtation with the Communists, U.S. policy more recently has turned in Nasser's favor. Recalling the days not so long ago when Cairo Radio was spouting ugly lies about the U.S., Washington is not inclined to be Nasser's sponsor. But the U.S. can cooperate with the man whose name is on every Arab lip. Officially, the U.S. aims at assisting any government, no matter what its form, that appears to be sincerely and effectively working for internal development and the good of its people. With indifference to social systems, the U.S. has aided Egypt on the left and Iran on the right, recognized the monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia as well as pro-Nasser Yemen. But there is a line drawn by the U.S. "If the cold war in the Arab world threatens the large American interests in, say, Saudi Arabia, we'll have to take a stand," says a U.S. official.

Similarly, the U.S. considers itself non-aligned in the struggle between Israel and the Arab world. Washington's attitude toward Arab union is still tied to a pronouncement made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during the Eisenhower Administration. Dulles said then, and it was repeated last week in Washington, that the U.S. looks with favor on any movement toward Arab union that is not imposed from outside the Arab world.

Great Coups. Nasser today takes an indulgent view of the U.S. His earlier resentments, he says, resulted from American attempts to force Egypt into joining such "imperialist" groupings as the Mediterranean Defense Organization and the Baghdad Pact. Nasser applauds the present Administration in Washington because "Kennedy tried from the first to understand us and to be realistic when facing the Arab world. Under John Foster Dulles, the U.S. withdrew its aid for the Aswan Dam. we faced blockade and even the blocking of our own money in U.S. banks." However, Nasser concedes, "it should not be forgotten that the U.S. stood by us in the United Nations during the Suez crisis, and that left a good impression."

President Nasser and President Kennedy have become close correspondents. "We are very frank with each other," says Nasser. "We don't exchange diplomatic words but express honest and frank opinions. I believe we have built up a confidence in each other." The confidence ex tends to U.S. Ambassador John Badeau, who speaks fluent Arabic and has unlimited access to Nasser, while his British counterpart sees Nasser only twice a year at formal meetings. The Communists are so convinced that the U.S. controls events in the Middle East that the Polish ambassador in Cairo stopped a U.S. diplomat at the entrance to a luncheon party and said bitterly: "I must congratulate you on your tremendous achievements in Iraq and Syria. You have made two great coups."

Jiggled Leg. At week's end in Cairo, the conferences on Arab unity droned on to the accompaniment of cigarette smoke and endless small cups of coffee. Nasser sat in on the negotiations, serenely confident that what finally emerged would be what he wanted. At 45, Nasser's hair has greyed at the temples, and he has given up tennis for the less demanding sport of swimming. He appears as physically fit as ever and retains his old nervous habits of jiggling his leg while sitting, and of smoking five packs of L. & M.s a day; like most Egyptians, he cannot stand the local brands. He still works twelve and 18 hours at a clip and is still the only man in the government who can be reached at any hour. A close aide says: "I've never heard of anyone getting chewed out for calling Nasser in the middle of the night. I do know of many who have been given unshirted hell for not calling him when something happened. He won't like you to say this, but it is still strictly a one-man show. He has lots of good technical help, but he trusts no one else with politics."

Even more than Russians, Arabs express their folk wisdom in proverbs, ranging from the cautionary (see cover) to the racially skeptical ("Better the tyranny of the Turks than the justice of the Arabs"). There are proverbs aplenty to fit the dream of unity. To the ambitious Nasser, other Arab leaders might point out the one that says. "The camel driver has his plans, and the camel has his." But proverbs are eclipsed by power, and last week nothing was more certain than that whatever unity scheme emerges in the Middle East, must, first of all, be satisfactory to Gamal Abdel Nasser. For of all the revolutions involved, only his in Egypt has survived and prospered for a full ten years.

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