New Fail-Safe

If an atomic attack is launched against the U.S., the U.S. will not necessarily unleash all of its thermonuclear power in return. The Kennedy Administration contends that power could be used selectively "so that there will be a way to stop a war before all of the destruction of which both sides are capable has been wrought." One byproduct of this theory is that it should ease the deep U.S. dread--as demonstrated by the bestselling success of the novel Fail-Safe--that such a war could start by mistake.

The Administration's design requires that top U.S. Government and military commanders survive an atomic attack, and that they maintain absolute control over their weapons systems. Under past plans, neither condition has been met. Says one Pentagon arms-control expert: "Our setup was actually designed to act in time of general var like a chicken with its head cut off. The brain could be destroyed and the nervous system severed. Then the military muscles would just jerk in uncontrolled spasms." To hold the chicken together, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara has spent several hundred million dollars toward a taut new National Military Command System. It should keep a nervous G.I. in Europe from firing his atomic bazooka in the dark of night, or prevent a B-52 crew from striking Russia because of a communications breakdown. Much of NMCS, as Pentagonians discreetly call the system, is secret. But its major elements include:

> A new seaborne top-command center in the heavy cruiser Northampton, from which the President and his aides could direct a war. Its 60 transmitters and 150 receivers can handle some 3,000 messages daily by voice, Teletype or code to and from U.S. military units anywhere in the world.

> Conversion of three KC-135 turbojet tanker aircraft, stationed at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, to provide similar command centers aloft.

> Conversion of 20 more KC-1355 and four 6-473 to build up the Strategic Air Command's own force of airborne control centers. Since last February, SAC has kept one of three such centers constantly in the air.

> Creation, for the first time, of an extensive, overall command center in the Pentagon. Previously, each service monitored its own activities from its own command center, fed information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

> Completion of an undisclosed number of underground replicas of the Pentagon command center near Washington, each protected against missile destruction.

> Transfer of all wire communications of each service to a single agency responsible directly to McNamara.

> Tougher screening of the men who man nuclear weapons. They now may be banned for "overindulgence in alcohol," "financial or family irresponsibility," unspecified "behavioral changes,'' any social maladjustment.

> Tightened physical restraints to prevent unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. These range from the use of old-fashioned hand-crank generators to set off antiaircraft missiles--just to introduce another man into the launch sequence--to requirements that two officers turn keys within 2-12 seconds of each other before an ICBM can be triggered. Most important is a complex and highly secret new system of remote-control electronic locks that must be opened by responsible officers to fire even tactical Army weapons.

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