Defensive Gap

Ever since Canada joined the U.S. in NORAD for air defense of the North American continent, one of the liveliest debates up north (though largely unheard down in the U.S.) has been the question of whether there should be nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. Canadian and U.S. airmen consider it vital to equip Canadian interceptors with nuclear-tipped air-to-air rockets, even more important to arm U.S.-supplied Bomarc antiaircraft missiles with atomic warheads. The latest Gallup poll on the subject shows that 61% of Canada's citizens agree. But Canadian External Affairs Secretary Howard Green, a staunch advocate of disarmament at the U.N., has long argued against the idea on the theory that the fewer countries with nuclear bases the better. And Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, ever mindful that opposition Liberal Leader Lester B. Pearson once won a Nobel Peace Prize, backs him up. No nukes for Canada.

The Cuban crisis showed up the vital hole in joint North American defense. For 48 hours after President Kennedy's blockade announcement, Ottawa could not even make up its mind whether to put Canada's armed forces on alert. While Diefenbaker's Cabinet took its time trying to decide, the RCAF took matters into its own hands. Responsible for sharing in the defense of an air corridor point at the industrial heart of North America. RCAF commanders brought their five squadrons (64 planes) of U.S.-built F-101B Voodoo interceptors to combat readiness; air bases were sealed off, planes were fueled and armed--but with relatively ineffectual high-explosive warheads, not the nuclear tips their Falcon rockets must have to wipe out an entire squadron of attacking bombers in one blast. There was no point even alerting the Bomarc missile squadron at North Bay, Ont.: Bomarcs are as useless as spitballs without nuclear warheads.

Eventually, Diefenbaker announced that he had ordered Canadian units "into the same level of readiness as the U.S. forces under NORAD control." But when the Pentagon requested permission for U.S. air defense squadrons to move into forward bases in Canada, permission was refused. Again, when the U.S. asked to arm interceptors at Goose Bay, Labrador, and Stephenville, Newfoundland, with nuclear warheads ferried from Bangor, Me., permission was refused. Officially, Canadian and U.S. airmen at NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs had nothing to say. "This is politics," said one officer. Privately, they ground their teeth in frustration. The incident did illustrate an interesting point. Across Ontario and Quebec, there is a 300-mile gap in NORAD 's first line of air defense.

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