Hobson's Choice

Over the past six months, before the 17-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the West has argued that any agreement to halt nuclear weapons tests must include adequate provisions for inspection to ensure that neither side is cheating. Russia, which claims that inspection would amount to legalized espionage, has clung just as doggedly to its demand for an unpoliced moratorium, similar to the 34-month "gentleman's agreement" that was shattered by Soviet tests last fall.

Last week the West made its most determined effort yet to come to terms with the Soviet Union. The U.S. and Britain dramatically offered Nikita Khrushchev his choice of two draft treaties. It was, in effect, a Hobson's choice, since Russia has repeatedly rejected the first of the two proposals, which envisages a system of inspection and control. The West's second, more radical draft represents a major concession. It calls for a halt to testing in the atmosphere, space and under water--and contains no policing provisions--but underground tests would be permitted.

Simple People. The West's willingness to waive on-site inspection is backed by improved monitoring techniques that can now identify and pinpoint most types of explosion from outside Russia's borders. However, scientists are not yet positive that they can always distinguish some underground tests from earthquake shocks; hence, the U.S. decision against banning subterranean tests until it has the foolproof detection devices to make the ban stick.

Pooh-poohing the West's eagerness to end atmospheric pollution as "playing upon the emotions of simple people," Soviet Delegate Vasily Kuznetsov rejected the new proposal. Nonetheless. Kuznetsov hinted that it might be acceptable to Russia provided it included a "firm understanding" that all underground tests be halted pending a "permanent solution." He also dangled an unexpected specific: he suggested Jan. 1 as a starting date, indicating that the present Soviet test series will be over by then.

Encouraged, the U.S. and Britain refused to take Russia's nyet for a final answer, urged that the conference subcommittee stay in session instead of recessing this week, in hopes of reaching an agreement by Nov. 1, when the issue is scheduled to return to the U.N. General Assembly.

The West argues that without some workable formula for ending tests, there is no hope of restricting the spread of nuclear weapons. Next nation expected to join the nuclear club is Communist China.

A U.S. Disarmament Agency spokesman last week blurted that China's bang was coming "within a matter of months," though later his estimate was amended to "about a year or two." In any event, Peking has the skilled scientists and the reactors to produce a crude atomic device, though it would still take China years to develop a stockpile of nuclear weapons.

Built-in Temptation. Meanwhile, if the West intended its new offer to be rejected by Russia while winning; plaudits from neutral nations at the conference, it was a waste of effort. Encouraged by the West's concessions, neutral delegates--who know better than to pressure Russia --merely tried to cajole Britain and the U.S. into banning underground tests as well, which they flatly refused to do without any sure way of checking Soviet violations.

But if the proposal was a serious one, it could mean that the recent U.S. test series has convinced Washington that the West's nuclear position is now unassailable. An unpoliced ban gives Russia a built-in temptation to cheat; in a closed society, the lengthy preparations needed to plan a new test series can be effectively concealed. U.S. Delegate Arthur Dean conceded the risks. Said he: "The U.S. would have to step up its own detection network, including observation satellites." But the West now seems more perturbed by the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons. Declared Dean: "Having no test ban at all would bring bigger risks."

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