The New Nuclear Look

Before leaving for his swing around Western Europe. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk let it be known that he did not intend to bring up the problem of the separate nuclear force that the French insist on building. As it turned out, it became the major issue of Rusk's trip. In effect, the U.S. is developing a new nuclear policy for Europe. The U.S. wants to avoid proliferation of H-bombs, and has in fact tightened up on control of its own nuclear weapons abroad. But Washington has realized that the French can at best be delayed but not stopped in their efforts to assemble their own force de frappe--and that the West Germans someday may want to follow suit. Henceforth the U.S. will try not to prevent that force but to absorb it into a general West European setup.

As soon as Rusk arrived in Paris, his hosts made clear that they were angered by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's recent Michigan speech in which he denounced new, small national H-bomb projects as risky and useless. McNamara had said that "limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent." Asked Charles de Gaulle of Rusk: "How am I going to explain this to the French people?"

Craving Coordination. Although the U.S. is totally committed to the nuclear defense of Western Europe, the French do not consider the commitment foolproof. Should there be a limited Russian attack on Western Europe, U.S. strategy calls for NATO's conventional "shield forces" to resist, thereby providing a "pause"during which the U.S. and its Allies can decide what to do. The French claim they fear that the U.S. might then decide to save its main force for the moment when the U.S. itself is attacked.

The fear seems absurd, considering not only U.S. pledges but U.S. self-interest, but the French cling to it. They know that a small nuclear force of their own could neither prevent nor successfully retaliate against a Soviet nuclear strike; but, should the "pause" ever occur, the French could force Washington's hand by the use of even limited nuclear weapons. In other words, they could leave the U.S. no choice but to finish what the French had started.

Rusk explained that the key words in McNamara's speech were "operating independently." The U.S., he said, does not object to France's independent bomb-building; what bothers Washington is that France might use their nuclear weapons independently of NATO policy. It might be time, Rusk suggested, for France to think about coordinating its own plans for the force de frappe with America's nuclear planning.

Built-in Control. De Gaulle and French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville demurred politely. The question, said Couve, is not "actuelle" (current). After all, he pointed out, it will be at least 18 more months before France's nuclear force is ready for action. Couve's cool reply could hardly conceal France's glee that Rusk had made the request. For years, De Gaulle and his military men had been seeking a bigger say in Western strategic planning. Now the U.S. itself seemed to be suggesting just that.

The question remains as to just what is meant by "coordination." One scheme under discussion in Washington would give NATO its own nuclear capability, based on Britain's present modest H-bomb striking power and France's future force de frappe. The U.S. wants the Europeans themselves to work out the details, but strong U.S. assistance, including money, equipment, and hitherto secret information, would be forthcoming if they did.

For the U.S., the scheme has the advantages of a built-in control. NATO's commander, an American, might be given the only power to push the button; or he might require the approval of the NATO Council or of the President of the U.S. But there is considerable doubt that the French would accept this plan; basically, they argue, it would change nothing.

Genuine Partnership. One prominent supporter of the French view in the U.S. is Henry A. Kissinger, Harvard's cold-war scholar and adviser to the National Security Council and the Pentagon, who has been an advocate of active U.S. aide to De Gaulle's force de frappe, and of a European Atomic Force. In Kissinger's view, the only feasible "control" the U.S. should exercise over European nuclear power is that of genuine partnership--through plans, coordination, sharing of targets. But essentially the European force should be independent. Only that way, argues Kissinger, could French and other European fears be allayed. At the same time, the U.S. could exact a price from the Europeans for setting up an independent force--mainly greater contributions to Western Europe's conventional defenses, which Kissinger considers inadequate.

If any of these plans works, it could in the long run lead to the ultimate sensible solution: a European army. Under present circumstances, Washington is a long way from agreeing with Kissinger that a European force should or could be free of what he calls the "U.S. veto." The U.S. is committed to a nuclear war if and when Western Europe is attacked in a way that its conventional forces cannot handle. But the U.S. still insists on retaining a voice, if possible a decisive voice, in determining when that moment has come.

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