Victory by Radio?

In South Viet Nam, U.S. General Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, critically examined the Vietnamese air arm and found it good. Just before hopping into the pilot's seat to fly his jet KC-135 to the Philippines, LeMay said: "It's perfectly apparent to me that the Vietnamese government is making rapid strides in its efforts to clear the country of Communist insurgents." Other recent visitors to South Viet Nam were not so sure.

Victory Key. Back in Washington from a month of firsthand observation in the jungle were four sunburned, weary U.S. officers--a general and three colonels. To President Kennedy, the four antiguerrilla specialists reported that the war with the Viet Cong guerrillas is going better, but that the Communists are still winning. Some of the report's main points:

>>The peasants remain more friendly to the Viet Cong than to the pro-Western government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, and the peasants are the key to victory.

>> Corrupt local officials are putting a crimp in U.S. economic aid. Food for the peasants is spirited away and sold by local chieftains; other aid vanishes in transit to the provinces.

>>Communications have improved but are still lagging, making it difficult to spread Saigon's anti-Communist message.

>>What worked in Malaya--resettling peasants in "fortified villages" so that the guerrillas are cut off from peasant support--is not yet working in South Viet Nam. The peasants are passionately attached to their ancestral fields; when they are moved, they usually slip off into the jungle to join the Reds, who promise to give them back their land. In two fortified villages, part of "Operation Sunrise," where U.S. aid has supplied food, tools, houses and medical care, the peasants have discovered that life can be better than before. Elsewhere, they have simply been rounded up by uncomprehending district chiefs and put to work without pay. They listen sympathetically when the Viet Cong describe the fortified villages as "concentration camps."

What worries many U.S. observers is the divide-and-rule philosophy of President Diem, who is suspicious of any possible concentration of power against him. The fortified-villages operation, for instance, is split between two ministerial committees, one headed by Diem's powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the other by one of Diem's secretaries of state; there is no liaison between the committees and very little within them--six or seven separate plans for rural reconstruction have been drawn up, and none are really working. Moreover, U.S. advisers complain that units of the South Vietnamese army can hardly make a move without first clearing it with Saigon, wasting priceless time in striking back at the guerrillas.

High Price. Washington has moved to remedy in part the lack of communications in the Vietnamese villages. Twentythree villages are already equipped with mimeograph machines, enabling trained Vietnamese editors to produce daily news papers with stories supplied by short wave radio. More than 100 mobile film units tour the country showing short subjects ranging from how-to-do-it films on health and agriculture to hard-hitting ex poses on the Viet Cong. The U.S. State Department, which helps with the scenarios, estimates that the films were seen by 17 million people last year.

Latest effort: orders were placed last week for 50,000 transistor radios, which will be sold to the peasants for about $13 each. The price is high, but the U.S. State Department and the South Viet Nam Ministry of Information believe that they will be snapped up by such village leaders as the local mayor, the owner of the general store and the head of the farm cooperative. Peasants can be counted on to drop in, lured by the broadcasts. To be heard: three government stations, the Voice of America -- and Radio Hanoi in Communist North Viet Nam.

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