Anything Is Possible

Neither Berlin nor Bizerte was most on Charles de Gaulle's mind last week as he returned to his village of Colombey-les-deux-Eglises for twelve days' meditation. Too soon to get up steam about Berlin, he told everyone. As for Bizerte. the news that the Afro-Asian bloc got the 50 states needed to call a special session of the U.N. General Assembly brought only the cold reply that France would boycott it. What really troubled De Gaulle was Algeria.

It was Algeria that brought De Gaulle to power, and it was Algeria that could undo everything he has accomplished. Peace talks with the Algerian F.L.N. rebel delegation had collapsed. De Gaulle was faced with trying to keep a restless army and populace in check while the next move in Algeria was worked out. He sent Algerian Affairs Minister Louis Joxe, along with Defense Minister Pierre Messmer, to Algiers to check on the loyalty of the army and government officials and to probe the possibility of setting up some form of "provisional executive" in Algeria--a halfway house on the troubled road from French rule to Algerian independence. The travelers returned to Paris with gloomy reports. There seems little hope of finding any prominent Moslems willing to serve without F.L.N. permission. And should the F.L.N. agree, there is even less hope that the embittered French army or the recalcitrant Europeans (outnumbered 9 to 1 by Moslems) will accept the plan.

Plastic Applause. By day. Algiers appears as peaceful as any city of France, reported TIME Correspondent Edward Behr. After sunset, the streets resound to the powerful explosion of plastic bombs. Some nights there may be only three or four; once last week there were 19. When European audiences in movie houses hear the muffled roar of a distant bomb, they break into applause. The victims of the explosions are Moslem shopkeepers. Frenchmen who are considered to be liberals or Gaullists. or policemen who appear to be searching too hard for European terrorists.

Few senior officials can last more than a year in Algiers. The bombs the threats and actuality of assassination, and the passive resistance of their Algerian-born subordinates wear down even the most enthusiastic supporters of De Gaulle. At least half the top administrators have handed in their resignations or applied for transfer.

Extended Authority. As the Gaullist government in Algeria grinds slowly to a halt, the shadow government of the European ultras grows stronger. The European street mobs of May 1958, and the semi-soldiers of 1960's "barricades" week, were loudmouthed braggarts who usually gave away their plans long in advance. Today's ultras are well organized, disciplined, tough. Their spearhead is the S.A.O. (Secret Army Organization), an underground movement commanded by French officers who supported last April's four-day putsch led by ex-Generals Raoul Salan and Maurice Challe.

There is no lack of money. Starting with $800.000 stolen from a government safe during the April revolt, the S.A.O. also extracts funds from European sympathiz ers--the standard levy is 1% of salaries or wages. Paris has sent in police officials specially chosen for their reliability and toughness, but they have achieved little against the S.A.O. Said one: "We get a feeling we are working in a vacuum. Our orders are misinterpreted at lower echelons, and security leaks are flagrant."

With an estimated 15.000 hardcore members, S.A.O. since April has extended its authority from Algiers to the largely European cities of Oran. Bone and Constantine. Arms are smuggled in from Spain, and four tons of plastic explosive were stolen from an army-guarded munitions base near Algiers. Though Raoul Salan has overall command of S.A.O.. its tactical leader is reportedly ex-Colonel Yves Godard. who--like Salan--has been condemned to death in absentia for his part in the April rebellion. As chief of military and civil intelligence and security in Algiers from 1957 to 1960. Godard acquired an excellent working knowledge of the rebel F.L.N. and has modeled S.A.O. on its methods.

Major Force. S.A.O. makes no secret of its plans for a "decentralized and corporative" metropolitan France, should it ever come to power. Its political ideas echo those of the discredited Vichy regime of Marshal Petain in World War II. In the prevailing gloom, even former "moderate" Europeans in Algiers accept the S.A.O. line. Said one: "S.A.O. next year will be a major force not only in France but in Europe. It will be Europe's sole effective anti-Communist organization."

S.A.O. is capable of organizing another trial of arms with the Gaullist government. But previous failures have convincingly proved that a movement restricted to Algeria alone cannot win. The obvious conclusion: it will come to power only after De Gaulle is gone, exploiting the confusion caused by his departure. This leads some of them to wish to speed the day, and accounts for the increased security precautions in Paris and in Colombey-les-deux-Eglises.

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