Monday, Jun. 13, 1960
Dream of the Wise
Just as Stalin's aggressiveness inspired the birth of NATO in 1949, Khrushchev's aggressiveness was defeating its own purposes in Western Europe in 1960. On both sides of the English Channel last week, a post-summit reappraisal of power realities was subtly nudging forward the prickly cause of European unity.
"An Imposing Confederation." The pace was set, in majestic phrases, by the leader most often accused of undermining allied unity. In a television report to the French people on the summit fiasco, Charles de Gaulle declared: "France intends as far as she is concerned to be ready to defend herself. This means, first of all, that she shall remain an integral part of the Atlantic alliance." And behind the shield of the Atlantic alliance, emphasized De Gaulle, the nations of Western Europe "must organize to achieve their joint power and development."
Eloquently, De Gaulle conjured up the vision of "a European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals . . . this Western Europe which, in former times, was the dream of the wise and the ambition of the powerful." For the first time, De Gaulle conceded that the European Common Market might prove a step in the evolution of "an imposing confederation . . . a Western group at the very least equivalent to that which exists in the East." And, in words designed to soothe the divisive Franco-British feud over the Common Market, he declared that the Common Market nations "do not want this organization to injure the other countries of Europe and we must expect a way to be found of accommodating interests."
The First Swallow. To a Europe in need of inspiration, the words evoked memories of Charlemagne, France's Due de Sully and his 17th century "Grand Design," and other great "European" statesmen. "The Talleyrand of the 20th century," cried West Berlin's Tagesspiegel, delighted with evidence of Adenauer-style Europe-mindedness from a man once considered to be concerned only with French grandeur. In the U.S., where De Gaulle's soaring prestige had finally won him something close to his longstanding demand for equality with Britain in U.S. counsels, his assurances of France's solidarity with the Atlantic pact were cheered.
But the most important echoes came from Britain, where the failure of the detente with Russia cast new doubts on the wisdom of Britain's long refusal to associate itself with the Common Market Six except on British terms. Speaking to the Assembly of the Western European Union last week, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs John Profumo unexpectedly announced that Britain had decided "to consider anew" the idea of membership in the European Coal and Steel Community as well as EURATOM, the atomic pool of the Common Market Six.
There were hints from London that Britain might also soon propose a further compromise--membership in a customs union with the Common Market Six that would not entail acceptance of the Common Market's ultimate goal of complete economic integration. Skeptics on the Continent saw this as an effort to enjoy the privileges of the club without paying dues. But to those who longed for the day when a united Europe would stretch from Belfast to Berlin, the sight of Britain beginning to budge even a little was as welcome as spring's first swallow.
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