Second Time Around

The Nikita Khrushchev who put on a spectacular road show across Asia in 1955 was the man on the make, from the land on the make. The Khrushchev who ended his second Southeast Asia swing last week was a man who all too obviously thought he had it made--and meant to keep it if he could. It was a holding operation. His big purpose was to jack up Communism's prestige in Southeast Asia, which had been severely damaged by the aggressive conduct of his Chinese ally. Except perhaps in Afghanistan, his crowds were thin, especially compared to President Eisenhower's--and worse, his audiences were not really with him this time. His efforts to stay neutral on the Chinese-Indian border dispute were not sufficient to win the affection of neutralist Indians, who on this issue ardently believe there can be no neutrality between right and wrong.

On Boasting. As he arrived home in Moscow, Western diplomats as well as Communists added up his performance. He succeeded in showing that Russia was peace-minded, but made little attempt to show that Peking was too. He was not always public-relations smooth. His rude lecturing on the evils of the multi-party state irked India's multi-party Parliament, and his arrogant boasts that Soviet aid is purely altruistic, whereas Western loans always have strings attached, provoked Nehru to comment that nations grant aid to other nations "on the ground of enlightened self-interest." In Indonesia, Khrushchev hurt President Sukarno's pride in his country's culture by walking out halfway through a Balinese dance, and the two men--though finding each other useful--were obviously uncongenial. One mealtime exchange showed their feelings:

Sukarno: Indonesian socialism is not a severe socialism. It aims at a good life for all, with no exploitation.

Khrushchev: No, no, no! Socialism should mean that every minute is calculated--a life built on calculation.

Sukarno: But this is the life of a robot.

In one aside, Khrushchev remarked that China's industrial achievements were being made "at too great a cost" in human accounting.

On Barking. A more successful part of Khrushchev's trip was to make clear that the Soviet Union is not abdicating its influence in Asia to Peking. The Soviet leader attended a New Delhi ceremony at which his government extended $378 million credits to the Indians, and later he gave $250 million in low-interest loans to Indonesia. In Djakarta, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko did not insist that the final communique include the usual plea for Red China's admission to the U.N., the Indonesians having called the suggestion "inopportune"* ; Peking has been giving them a bad time over their law curbing overseas Chinese traders. And in Calcutta, where Khrushchev stopped over to meet Nehru and Burma's Prime Minister-designate U Nu, the air was festive because China's Chou En-lai had meanwhile agreed to visit New Delhi to discuss the Chinese-Indian border dispute. "The Indian people will overcome difficulties," shouted Khrushchev. "Let pug dogs bark while the Indian elephant marches forward!" "We are with him on this," replied Nehru.

On Peace & Might. By playing up so lavishly to the Asian leaders -- at a remove from the unspontaneous crowds -Khrushchev cut the ground from under local Communists. The day Khrushchev spoke in Calcutta, the chief minister of West Bengal faced down the Communist opposition leader's parliamentary criticism by citing Khrushchev's praise of Indian development. In Burma, where Communists' parliamentary strength was sliced from 45 to three in last month's elections, Khrushchev passed over local Reds to praise U Nu as "a great peace fighter." And in Indonesia, the Communist boss of the country's trade unions was thrown into jail shortly after paying a visit to Khrushchev.

Tieless in Calcutta's sun one day and trench-coated in Kabul's icy drizzle the next, the Soviet chieftain wound up his tour on a characteristic note, proclaiming himself the apostle of peace and his country "the world's strongest military power." He had mended some fences, dispensed a good deal of largesse. Peking's continued silence about his journey suggested, moreover, that the Chinese Communists had decided this was the most face-saving manner to adopt while conforming to Khrushchev's major line of peaceful coexistence.

But grandiose tours such as Khrushchev's are subject to the law of diminishing returns, and Khrushchev's second coming could not alter the fact that their experience with the Chinese Reds has caused Asians to look with a skeptical eye on Communists, whether they bear gifts or not.

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