Monday, Feb. 15, 1960
Dissent from Peking
Ostensibly, the leaders of the eight Communist-bloc countries who held an "Eastern summit" in Moscow last week had gone to talk agriculture. But their final communique was all about Berlin. And it was tough. "If efforts directed at signing a peace treaty with both German states do not meet support" at the Big Four summit, it said, the Communist bloc would all sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and "on this basis solve the problem of West Berlin as well." Naturally, these sentiments were unanimously adopted.
But a few days later, noises began to be heard indicating that all had not been so harmonious at Moscow after all. There were persistent reports from Eastern Europe that satellite countries had shown themselves reluctant at the meeting to follow Khrushchev's example and announce a cut in their armed forces. And from Peking came words from a speech delivered at the Moscow meeting by Chinese Observer Kang Sheng that was not mentioned at all, let alone published in Russia. At an earlier gathering of the clan in May 1958 it was announced that the sessions "in which an observer from the Chinese People's Republic also took part confirmed the unanimity of the governments represented." With good reason, no such claim was made this time. For Kang Sheng condemned Premier Khrushchev's coexistence policy at its key points: P: While the Moscow statement hailed the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations and expected more from Eisenhower's visit this summer, Kang said flatly: "The actions of the U.S. fully prove that its imperialist nature cannot be changed." P: While Moscow talked about Russia's eager expectancy of a disarmament agreement, Kang said flatly: "American action has proved that they will not give up the policy of the arms race."
If the Russians wanted to play down' disagreements, Peking plainly wanted to play them up--and perhaps to be seen challenging Russia within the Communist bloc on these important issues. Some British experts guess that this challenge in part impelled Khrushchev to come down so firmly on the Berlin issue. Whatever the reason, it served to make the prospect of any Berlin settlement at the summit that much harder, since it freezes Russia to positions that the West cannot accept.
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