Many Should Stay Home

INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,

AS every airman knows, there are too many airlines. To every nation, big or little, a "flag carrier" is a matter of national prestige. Since landing rights are awarded on a reciprocal basis, even the smallest nation can get into the business merely by awarding landing rights to other countries. At last count, no fewer than 200 so-called international airlines were in the air--when possibly half that number could do the job.

In some cases, small nations have a real need for an international line, or fly so efficiently that they can compete on even terms with bigger nations. The Netherlands' 38-year-old K.L.M. and Belgium's Sabena, both with far-flung routes and big, modern fleets, rank among the world's finest airlines, earn valuable foreign exchange and promote much tourism for their mother nations. Flying to the U.S. and South America, Japan Air Lines serves a booming nation of 90 million people, not only generates most of its own international traffic but has such an effective domestic network that it operates without subsidy. Australia's globe-circling Qantas gets heavy traffic from an area in the midst of rapid economic development, performs a real economic service as a lifeline to the rest of the wold.

But many other small nations are as out of place in international skies as pigeons among peregrines. More often than not they cannot operate except by turning themselves into cut-rate, fly-by-night carriers along the lines of the first postwar U.S. nonsked airlines. Usually, they do not pose a competitive threat to well-established lines, but in Latin America they have made flying a cutthroat business (TIME, May 5).

The small lines around the world also pose serious questions of efficiency. While many of the lines were set up--and fly--with the help of established carriers, most nations insist, for nationalistic reasons, on filling at least 50% of all air-crew jobs with their own men. Many of the native flyers do not yet have the training for the job. One U.S. captain for Saudi Arabian Airlines reports that his invariable instruction to his Arab copilot is "Don't touch anything." Indonesia's ambitious (39 planes) Garuda airline is in serious trouble since it fired all Dutch pilots and technicians; also facing trouble is Union of Burma Airways, with few experts--and with three Viscount turboprops on order.

Overambition spells heavy losses for many a small airline that once did well. For years, Thai Airways flew two DC-48 along a neat little system spreading out from Bangkok to Tokyo and Calcutta; then after crashes in 1953, the line tried to break into the big time by ordering three big Lockheed Super-G Constellations. In service last year, the planes promptly started losing $350,000 a month for Thai. Now the planes are grounded because the airline does not have enough money to operate them. Philippine Air Lines almost came a cropper by pushing too hard on international flights to the U.S., Japan and Europe, lost so heavily that the late Philippine President Magsaysay finally called a halt.

Few newcomers to flying seem to learn from the experience of others. Ireland, whose sole major airport (Shannon) is served by no fewer than twelve airlines, recently succumbed to the temptation of a transatlantic line even though it could only afford to lease three Super Constellations (and crews) from Seaboard & Western. Austria recently flew into the big time with a line prepared to go anywhere except where it is needed. Using four chartered Viscounts, Austrian Airlines will soon be serving such major--and well-served--cities as London, Zurich, Paris, Frankfurt, Rome and Warsaw. Yet the line has no service in Austria itself, which lacks an internal airline and badly needs one.

No one wants to shoot the small foreign carriers out of the air. But many airmen think they should stay out of the international big leagues and concentrate on regional feeder operations where they can perform a real economic service. A prime example is Lebanon's Middle East Airlines (48% British Overseas Airways Corp. owned), which operates a profitable Viscount service throughout the Arab world--where air traffic increases 30% annually (world increase: 13%)--and has no ambitions beyond operating as a feeder service. A second solution for small lines would be to merge with others to form one major international unit along the lines of Scandinavia's SAS, which has enough traffic, capital and competitive know-how to survive.

For those who insist on staying in the blue-chip game, the problem can only get worse--and in so doing, may help solve itself. With the new jets costing around $5,000,000 apiece, the international airline business will soon get so expensive that few of the small newcomers will be able to afford the heavy losses of competition in return for the hollow luxury of showing their flags to blase travelers at the world's airports.

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