Brink of Revolt

Indonesia edged closer and closer to revolt. In sweltering Djakarta, politicians apprehensively swapped rumors, and the press daily demanded the return of President Sukarno from his extended vacation. "Dally no more," urged the Times of Indonesia. But in Tokyo, Sukarno dallied on. He lunched with Emperor Hirohito, visited shrines, bandied compliments with Miss Nippon of 1951. "There is no cause for alarm or anxiety," said Sukarno.

Premier Djuanda thought otherwise. Last week Djuanda dispatched the Mas-jumi (Moslem) Party's respected Elder Statesman Mohammed Roem to insurgent headquarters at Padang in Sumatra to propose a compromise. Djuanda's offer: if the dissidents agree to stay their hand until the President returns, he will ask Sukarno to purge the National Council of its Communists and fellow travelers and to invite former Vice President Mohammed Hatta back into the government, probably to take over as Premier from Djuanda himself.

Too Late? Djuanda's compromise might have come too late. In Padang, Roem found some civilian leaders receptive. "But," Masjumi Party Chairman Mohammed Natsir told him, "it is not for us to decide." Plainly, Colonel Maludin Simbolon and his fellow colonels have grown increasingly impatient with Sukarno's attempts to solve the crisis by postponement, and the colonels' power is decisive in Padang's councils. For they control most of oil-and rubber-rich Sumatra (which they propose to make the base of their counter-government if Sukarno cannot be brought to terms), can also claim scattered support in the nominally uncommitted areas of Borneo, Java and the Celebes.

Even the Masjumi Party's Natsir, while counseling moderation and patience, had himself turned outspokenly critical of Su karno. "West Irian [West New Guinea] was not a real issue for Sukarno," Natsir wrote in an open letter published in the Sumatra press. "It was only the stepping-stone for a far greater strategical move--the severance of all relations with the Western democracies, and the use of the economic and political consequences of this action to bring Indonesia into the Soviet bloc."

Reproach for a Comrade. In an attempt to force Sukarno into action, the colonels dispatched a mission of their own to Tokyo. The delegation was headed by Colonel Joop Warouw, Indonesia's military attache in Peking, and Lieut. Colonel Ventje Sumual, commander of the rebellious Northern Celebes area. Warouw sought out Sukarno in Japan's state guest house. Warouw's account of the interview (as relayed by Sumual): "I told him to get rid of the Reds or quit, himself. He reproached me for these words, and asked if I had forgotten our past comradeship. I reminded him I once saved his life in Surabaya during the war against the Dutch, but told him: 'You must make a decision one way or the other. This is the point of no return.' He begged me for more time; I told him if he refused our demands, it would be a war of brother against brother. Sukarno broke down and wept."

"Sukarno," added Sumual, "is very old, and is finished.* Actually, it was not for him either to agree or disagree. Warouw just told him what is going to happen anyway."

By week's end Sukarno had begun to wear a harried look, announced that he would leave for Djakarta earlier than he had expected--but only because his wife is expecting a baby. Then he went off to a luncheon party at the Indonesian consulate in Kobe, where he led his guests in singing a ballad called When We Were Young and Gay. His press officer explained: "It's his favorite song."

*Colonel Sumual is 35; President Sukarno 56.

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