"Hold Fast"

Into the debate over the wisdom of the U.S.'s stern policy toward Communist China walked Secretary of State John Foster Dulles last week, and before he had taken three steps, the debate--so far as policymaking is concerned--was all but over. In the first full-dress Administration pronouncement oh China policy in three years--and one long overdue--Dulles declared flatly that the U.S. I) has no intention of easing its trade embargo on Red China, 2) has no valid reason for recognizing the Peking government, and 3) has no hope that the Chinese Communists will soon purge themselves of the contempt for peace that bars their entrance into the United Nations.

"The Chinese Communist Party . . . came to power by violence and, so far, has lived by violence," said Dulles to the convention of Lions International in San Francisco. "It retains power not by the will of the Chinese people but by massive, forcible repression ... It does not disguise its expansionist ambitions. It is bitterly hateful of the U.S., which it considers a principal obstacle in the path of its conquest. In the face of this condition, the U.S. has . . . abstained from any act to encourage the Communist regime morally, politically or materially."

Heavy Commitment. In terms considerably stronger than those used by the President at recent press conferences,' Dulles ticked off his argument against increased trade with Peking. "Trade with Communist China," he said, "is used to develop as rapidly as possible a formidable military establishment and a heavy industry to support it ... Whatever others may do," said he, in obvious reference to Britain's announced determination to increase its nonstrategic China trade (TIME, June 10), "surely the U.S., which has a heavy security commitment in the China area, ought not to build up the military power of its potential enemy."

U.S. recognition of Red China, Dulles went on, would have negative, immediate and grievous effects. Specifically it would:

C| "Immensely discourage" the mainland Chinese who, by Communist Mao Tse-tung's own admission, now seek "to change the nature of their government." EURf "Betray" the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist government on Formosa, the loyal and long-standing ally of the U.S., the real Free China.

<]f "Gravely perplex" the free countries of South Asia not only by encouraging the defection of their overseas Chinese communities but also by spreading fears that the U.S. does not intend to stand firm against Asia's Communists. "The unifying and fortifying influence is above all the spirit and resolution of the U.S. If we seemed to waver and to compromise . . . that would assist international Communism to score a great success in its program to encircle us."

"We Know That . . ." Turning to the question of Red China's membership in the U.N., Dulles noted that the U.N. is not a "reformatory for bad governments . . ." Communist Russia, with veto power, already seriously limits'the U.N.'s peacemaking function, and Communist China in the U.N. would compound the damage. "Should a regime which in seven years has promoted five foreign or civil wars--Korea, Indo-China, Tibet, the Philippines and Malaya; which itself has fought the U.N. and which today stands condemned by the U.N. as an aggressor; which defies the U.N. decision to reunify Korea; which openly proclaims its con tinuing purpose to use force--should that regime be given a permanent seat . . . in the U.N.?"

To the China policy critics who hold that Peking should be recognized because the Communists are in de facto control of the country, Dulles said: "The U.S. knows that the Chinese Communist regime exists. We know that very well, because they fought us in Korea. [But] let me say emphatically that the U.S. need never succumb to the argument of 'inevitability' . . . The reality is that ... a system which seeks to impose conformity is always in danger--and that results from the basic nature of human beings."

The Danger. "What of the future? Are our policies merely negative? Do we see any prospect of resuming the many friendly ties which, for many generations, the American people have had with the Chinese people?" To the last question, Dulles' answer: yes. "Communism is repugnant to the Chinese people. They are above all individualists. We can confidently assume that international Communism's rule of strict conformity is, in China as elsewhere, a passing and not a perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves, our allies and the Chinese people to do all that we can to contribute to that passing. If we believed that this passing would be promoted by trade and cultural relations, we would have such relations.

"Our policies are readily adjustable to meet the requirements of changing conditions--but there are occasions when not we, but others, should provide the change. Nothing could be more dangerous than for the U.S. to operate on the theory that if hostile and evil forces do not quickly and readily change, then it is we who must change to meet them.

"If Communism is stubborn for the wrong, let us be steadfast for the right.

"The capacity to change is an indispensable capacity. But equally indispensable is the capacity to hold fast that which is good."

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