Monday, Jun. 10, 1957

How to Win Elections

For several subtle reasons, West Germany's ancient (81) Chancellor Konrad Adenauer always seems to contribute as much during his trips to Washington as he takes away in promises and reassurances for home political consumption. Partly it is because of his remarkable spryness, the grandfatherly twinkle in his wintry blue eyes while he is driving his hardheaded points. Partly it is because the U.S. has a better feeling about an explosively expanding Germany when it is personified by Adenauer's good sense and restraint. Partly it is because Adenauer stands rocklike in his antiCommunism, even though his Germany is alternately set upon and smiled upon by the Communists next door.

All these qualities were evident last week as Adenauer plodded through his fifth visit in Washington. Into three days Adenauer crammed a White House meeting with President Eisenhower, two formal sessions with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a round of state dinners, a press conference, a visit to the National Gallery of Art, and separate speeches to the House and Senate (he spoke in German, but printed translations were handed around in advance). On Capitol Hill, Campaigner Adenauer was introduced to the 1956 rivals for the vice-presidency, California's Richard Nixon and Tennessee's Estes Kefauver. Adenauer jokingly asked them for a bit of advice on how to win his own upcoming election campaign. Advised Nixon and Kefauver in rare agreement: get out and shake plenty of hands. "It must be good," mused the Chancellor, no mean handshaker himself. "I'll use it."

It was basically to get political aid for the September elections that Konrad Adenauer came to the U.S. Keenly aware that his political enemies are making capital out of his failure to reunite divided Germany, Adenauer wanted Ike to soothe West German fears that the U.S. might make a disarmament agreement with Russia without insisting on German reunification as part of the deal. Adenauer got what he wanted: issued after his White House visit was an Eisenhower-Adenauer joint communique affirming that 1) U.S. disarmament negotiations would not "prejudice" German reunification, and 2) no "comprehensive"' disarmament agreement would be made before "a prior solution" of the reunification problem. As a special favor, Ike promised in the communique to consult with Britain and France about holding a four-power conference with Russia aimed at German reunification, as Adenauer urged, when and if "an initial disarmament agreement" is reached.

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