The Disarmament Problem

It is too much to say that there is "real hope" for disarmament progress with the Russians. President Eisenhower told his news conference last week; nonetheless, the fact that Moscow has taken a "different tone" and is becoming "more serious" at the U.N. disarmament talks in London gives ground for guarded optimism. Among the reasons for the different tone: the Soviets, "as well as all the rest of the world, are feeling the pinch" of maintaining "these tremendous military organizations." However, warned Ike, "this doesn't mean that they are not . . . going to want just as big an advantage out of [arms reduction] as they can get."

The President's warning came just before the London talks recessed until next week and Presidential Disarmament Adviser Harold Stassen flew home to report fresh progress toward "partial disarmament" providing for a cutback in arms, manpower and defense costs. Three days before Stassen's arrival, Secretary of State Dulles had also moved in to mod erate any undue optimism about the talks that Happy Harold Stassen might generate. The Soviet proposals, Dulles granted at his news conference, marked "a certain measure of progress." But the Administration would make no disarmament moves--which could involve the "very existence of the U.S. itself"--on the basis of unverifiable Soviet promises to abide by the agreements.

Korea is a case in point: there the lack of any sound method to enforce the 1953 armistice agreement has led to so many Communist violations that the U.S. is now considering supplying U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea with nuclear weapons to equalize the Communist buildup of arms and airfields in North Korea.

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