Guided Missives

"Life is returning to normalcy. We must exert all efforts to ease international tensions." Thus, fortnight ago, Nikita Khrushchev called for a change of pace in Russian diplomacy, which for weeks past has consisted largely of sending threatening notes all over Europe, warning NATO allies not to allow atomic bases within their borders. Last week, obedient to Khrushchev's signal, Russia began spraying the air with a new set of spitballs.

First came pious appeals to Britain, France and the U.S. to join the U.S.S.R. in renouncing the use of force in the Middle East. While the Western powers were still busily explaining what a poor idea this was, the Russians blandly announced that they were about to release the text of the pre-Suez invasion notes in which Khrushchev had warned Sir Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet against attacking Egypt. In what they apparently considered a shrewd counterpunch, the British hastily published the notes before the Russians could--and thereby helped to remind the Arabs that Russia alone among major powers had sided with Egypt before the invasion.

The Compendium. Russia's major diplomatic effort of the week was an 8,000-word note to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan signed by spade-bearded Premier Bulganin. Ostensibly an appeal for restoration of friendly relations, the note was a compendium of familiar Russian gambits. In it, Bulganin:P: Hinted that Russia would welcome a Big Four conference on the reunification of Germany. Expressed new interest in Sir Anthony Eden's Geneva proposal for a demilitarized zone in Central Europe. P: Reminded Macmillan that Britain's "comparatively small and densely populated territory" is, by recent British admission, virtually indefensible against nuclear attack.

P: Called on Britain (which is about to set off its first H-bomb) to agree to a temporary suspension of nuclear tests-now that Russia itself had just set off five nuclear explosions within two weeks.

Britons, when asked to remember Geneva, are more inclined to remember Budapest. To the government, as to London's conservative Daily Telegraph, the Bulganin note was designed for propaganda rather than negotiations, "a guided missive . . . aimed at Downing Street but designed to affect millions everywhere." Nonetheless, Prime Minister Macmillan took it seriously enough to make it the subject of two Cabinet meetings and a private talk with Sir Winston Churchill.

No Answer Needed. The chief effect of Moscow's guided missive was one the Russians probably had not foreseen. The day after the note was made public, West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer called in Soviet Ambassador Andrei Smirnov and spent two hours discussing it with him. What was all that talk of a demilitarized Germany and a German withdrawal from NATO? How, demanded Adenauer, did this square with suggestions to West Germany that, even without sacrificing her ties with the West, she might hope to enjoy "the spirit of Rapallo" (the Russo-Germany treaty of 1922)?

Clearly angered by the questions, Moscow abandoned its sweet reassurances and got off a truculent note to Bonn. Unless West Germany is reconciled to winding up as "one big cemetery," warned the Russians, she, too, had better refuse to accept any NATO atomic bases. What was more, there could be no serious talk of German reunification unless Adenauer abandoned his idea of acquiring tactical atomic weapons for his new army.

None of this constituted an answer to Adenauer's original question, but the shrewd old Chancellor had not really expected any. With a general election coming up, what Adenauer wanted--and what he got--was public confirmation that, no matter what his Socialist opponents might say, Russia is far less interested in German reunification on any terms than it is in preserving the status quo in Europe, so as to give itself time to regain its hold on the satellites.

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