Nasser's Canal

MIDDLE EAST

The nine small ships nosed slowly past the sun-baked jetties at the entrance to Port Said harbor and into the open Mediterranean--the first convoy to pass through the Suez Canal in five months. Harbor vessels tooted joyously, and on the quays crowds broke into cheers.

What 18 nations had sought to avoid, what England and France had fought to prevent, Gamal Abdel Nasser was on the way to achieving. The canal was open and operating on Nasser's terms.

The Political Wreck. U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold had turned up in Cairo to present, among other things, the West's plan (sponsored by the U.S., Britain, France and Norway) to have half the tolls paid to the International Bank until a final settlement is negotiated. Nasser was disposed to negotiate no settlements. Early last week Hammarskjold watched as the salvage crews at last raised the tug Edgar Bonnet, which Nasser had used for so long as a "political wreck" to keep the canal blocked.

As Hammarskjold departed for New York, Nasser declared the canal open, and published his terms in a memorandum circulated to seven nations (but not to Britain and France), seeking "comments." His primary condition: the canal will be operated and managed by the nationalized Suez Canal Authority, and nobody else. Said Egyptian Spokesman Ali Sabri: "There will be no foreign supervision whatsoever." Other provisions:

P: Tolls will be paid in advance of transit to Egypt's Suez Canal Authority; U.S. dollars, Swiss francs, various European currencies are acceptable--but not English pounds or French francs.

P: Toll rates will be based on present levels, and Egypt pledges itself not to raise them more than 1% in the next twelve months; any increase beyond that level would be subject to "negotiations."

P: Disputes under the 1888 convention, which Nasser accepts, can be referred to the International Court of Justice.

P: Five per cent of all receipts will go to the Egyptian government as royalty (roughly the same amount paid by the old company). Another 25% will be set aside for developments and improvements of the canal; this will include the $287 million "ninth program" planned by the old company before seizure, which by 1968 would make the canal two-way for two-thirds of its length and deepen it enough to handle tankers up to 60,000 tons.

P: Any complaints of discrimination can be arbitrated by a tribunal, with a neutral member to be appointed by the president of the International Court.

Bald Terms. Nasser was plainly more cocky than he had been last fall. There was now no mention of the U.N.'s six principles he had accepted then, in particular the provision that the canal be "insulated from the politics of any nation." Compensation for the old company's stockholders was referred to "arbitration," in which Nasser could be expected to bring counter-claims for war damages. Though there were polite thanks for the U.N.'s help in clearing the canal and promises of "continued cooperation" with users, the plan stated in all but bald terms that it is Egypt's canal and will be run Egypt's way. Nasser did not mind if the $20 million which the U.N. had spent in clearing the canal was added to the regular tolls, though he would not consent to Egypt's paying any of the costs for raising the hulks which the Egyptians had sunk.

Once again, Nasser had played his hand with skill. After keeping the canal blocked for months as a lever on Western nations, he had converted its opening into a kind of reverse lever. For shippers were so eager to resume transit that they rushed through without a quibble at his terms. Italian, Greek and West German (as well as Communist) vessels were in the first convoy. The U.S., Britain and France were still "advising" their ships to avoid the canal for the moment while they dickered for better terms.

But though the New York Times called Nasser's terms an "absurd ultimatum," the Western powers seemed to hold out little real hope of extracting any major concessions: they might, in return for making the arrangement two-way instead of unilateral, firm up the contractual status of the agreement. But Nasser no longer faced the threat of armed attack by Britain or France, and Britain's Foreign Office acknowledged privately that any attempt at economic boycott could not be long maintained in the face of bitter opposition from shipping companies watching their competitors steam through the canal.

So Little in Hand. On other issues, Hammarskjold was only slightly more successful. Typically, Hammarskjold tried, in the words of an aide, to convert the disputed passage to the Gulf of Aqaba "from a political to a legal question." He got Nasser's oral agreement to allow the UNEF to remain at Sharm el Sheikh indefinitely while the U.N. seeks an advisory opinion from the World Court as to whether the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway, as Israel and the U.S. contend. Nasser reportedly also agreed not to rush Egyptian troops back into Gaza and to try to restrain his fedayeen. (Presumably Nasser is willing to have the UNEF between him and the superior Israeli army.) But Nasser refused to modify his claim of "belligerent" rights against Israel despite the 1949 armistice. With so little in hand, Hammarskjold returned to New York without even bothering to stop in Israel, whose political leaders have little faith in him.

Faintly visible in last week's developments was a possible acquiescence without agreement based on the referral of both Suez and Aqaba to the World Court. While judgment is being sought, the situation will be shaped to the local preponderance of strength: in Suez, where Egypt has the means and authority to make it stick, Israeli shipping will be barred pending the decision; in Aqaba, Israel is determined and the U.S. is committed to send through ships unless and until the World Court rules otherwise.

Even this makeshift modus operandi had to be found between the lines. In public, Nasser insisted to a group of visiting U.S. editors that both the Suez and Aqaba waterways are in Egyptian territory. The U.S., he said, "is aiming to starve us out, while the Soviet Union is aiming to help us'' with shipments of wheat. "We like to be friendly to the U.S.," but "we will not surrender to American pressure."

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