The Inner Interests

Last week half the world's capitals reverberated with pronouncements about the Suez Canal. Most of that speaking was in the high language of morality and the heightened tone of rhetoric. Not so easily detected, though present, was the urgent call of self-interest. Items:

France is united from right to left--except for the Communists--in regarding the Suez crisis as an unexpected opportunity to destroy Nasser, the man they see behind all their North African troubles. This weighs far more deeply with them than the seizure of the French canal company.

India, despite its ringing endorsement of Egyptian sovereignty, finds itself for the first time face to face with a piece of "anticolonialism" that could hurt it as sorely as it could hurt the powers west of Suez. Since most of India's trade with Europe moves via Suez, any interference with canal traffic or an increase in canal rates would play hob with India's new five-year plan. Even more disturbing to India is the prospect that if Nasser were to fall, Egypt (and the canal) might fall into the hands of an orthodox Moslem government that would ally itself with India's bitter enemy, Moslem Pakistan. Nehru is, therefore, almost as anxious as Eden to ensure that Egypt does not win unfettered control of the canal. But unlike Eden, Nehru wants no overthrow of Nasser. Nasser, unique among Moslem leaders, is on better terms with New Delhi than with Karachi. Nehru's solution: public denunciation of Britain and France, accompanied by a quiet word to the British that he has refrained from criticizing Nasser because "condemnation at this point would have impaired our ability to influence the Egyptians."

Greece, though a considerable maritime power, was the only nation besides Egypt to refuse to attend the conference. How could a Greek Foreign Minister go to London when Cyprus is in an uproar?

The U.S.S.R. (in the judgment of the U.S. State Department), above all else, wants no war at this time, and has played a less mischievous role in the Middle East since Eden warned B. & K. in London that Britain means business there. But there are always secondary gains to exploit. Russia is winning an inexpensive popularity in the Arab world by its pro-Egyptian propaganda blasts, and also sees in the London conference an opportunity to end the historic Russian fear of Turkish closure of the Dardanelles to Russian vessels. (The Montreux Convention of 1936, which guarantees passage of the Dardanelles to Russian ships, expires this year.) By emphasizing that Suez is only one of many "canals and straits" of international importance, the Soviets can also talk about the Dardanelles and the Panama Canal as well.

West Germany, which agreed to attend the London conference, did so out of unwillingness to offend Britain, France and the U.S. The West Germans would much rather stay home. They have business interests of their own to develop in the Arab Middle East and do not want to incur Arab hostility. In such an event they fear that Nasser's revenge might be to recognize Communist East Germany, which would compel Chancellor Adenauer to make good on his threat to break off relations with any nation that recognizes the East German government.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.