Fat Man's Challenge

For weeks Western governments had known that the Russians were going to do it. Nikita Khrushchev had said as much to Harold Stassen, amidst the drinks and din of the party at Claridge's. But when the announcement came last week that the Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces by 1,200,000 men by May 1957, the response of the West was confused, contradictory and uncertain.

The British estimated that the action would reduce the Russians' total uniformed manpower by as much as one-third. The Russians themselves said it meant the disbandment of 63 divisions and brigades, including some 30,000 men stationed in East Germany. They said they also intend to mothball 375 naval vessels, deactivate three air divisions, cut armaments and military budgets. "Other governments," said the Russian statement, "insofar as they are sincerely willing to contribute to the strengthening of peace, cannot but follow suit."

Opposite Tacks. With a single voice, the West pointed out that by declaring the cut unilaterally, the Russians allowed no possibility of verifying whether they actually carry out their pledges. But the West seemed agreed on little else. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles first declared that he had predicted it, then suggested that the Russians might not go through with it, that even if they did, no one should let his guard down, ended by arguing that the Soviet striking power might even be increased by the transfer of these men from the armed forces to factories. A newsman demanded whether Dulles would rather these men stayed in the army. Said Dulles: "I would rather have them standing around doing guard duty than making atomic bombs."

In Britain, Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden took an almost opposite tack. "We welcome the Russian reductions," he said. "If it so happens that everybody starts to catch this habit, we shall have no objection. But I think we are entitled to say that we were the first to start it." And Minister of Defense Sir Walter Monckton, though conceding that the Russians would still have 237 divisions under arms v. NATO's 100, announced that Britain was reducing its armed forces by another 70,000 men.

In Europe's capitals the Russian cut was regarded confidently as genuine, for the reason that it made simple sense for the Russians themselves:

P:They don't need that many soldiers any more. With modern weapons, mass armies can safely be streamlined without any cost in striking power--as the U.S. did with its "new look" of two years ago--and the savings can be spent on other things, notably more air power, heightened missile development. In Britain, Khrushchev had grandly offered to sell the British cruisers like the one he came on. "Under modern conditions," grinned Khrushchev, doubtless reflecting the thinking of Russia's top military men, "the best thing a cruiser can be used for is to carry guests to a friendly country."

P: Russians do need the men in factories and on the farms, and admit it frankly. The Soviet economy is expanding. One British economist has estimated that Russia, which is out to match present U.S. production by 1963, will by then be "the industrial giant of the Eurasian land mass." Russia's manpower need is acute because of the low birth rate during the war, which is just beginning to be felt in the recruiting of 16-year-olds. By 1958 there will be only an estimated 800,000 boys and girls entering Russia's work force v. 2,500,000 in 1954.

P: The Russians gained a big propaganda advantage in disarmament.

P: Since there is no check on their activities, they can always recall the men at short notice.

P: The cut would have no appreciable effect on Russia's real power--its massive air force and burgeoning submarine fleet.

P: Their action put an added strain on the creaking NATO structure. The Russians reason that NATO was welded together by fear. Reduce the fear, and the alliance may yet fall apart.

Cries for Relief. Europeans, putting on a more hopeful look than the airpower-minded U.S., also see the announcement as proof of their basic assumption since Geneva: that the Soviet no longer fears attack from the West and plans none of its own. Already, German Social Democrats and Free Democrats are demanding "a serious review" of West Germany's projected rearmament. In Britain a group of 55 Laborites led by Nye Bevan declared that the reduction "made it clear that the challenge of Communism is economic, social and political--not military," and demanded the end of conscription and reduced defense spending.

Soberest reaction came from Harold Stassen, who announced that a group of eight distinguished soldiers and experts has been called to assess the implications of the Russian gambit. The advisory group would also try to find an answer for Russia's expected demand that the West match their reductions. To that expected challenge, Dulles recently provided a short answer in the form of an anecdote: A fat man and a thin man agreed to go on a diet; the fat man got healthier, the thin man starved to death.

While the West pulled itself together, Russia briskly put its new program on display by ordering the first of 30,000 troops out of East Germany amid moving farewells from German comrades and pledges of undying gratitude. Nothing was said about the 235,000 Russian soldiers who will remain there.

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