The Tiger's Strength

During his 30-minute radio-television report on Asia last week, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not once mention the words that commentators and headline-writers were straining to hear: Quemoy and Matsu. But while he left open the specific question of U.S. defense of these little Nationalist-held islands off Red China's coast, Dulles outlined a general principle of U.S. Asian policy of tremendous implication. The U.S. fully intends to protect the free nations of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific against Communist attack, and is well aware that it may have to go to war to do it.

"I come back from Asia greatly impressed by the spirit and the purpose of the governments and peoples with whom I had contact," said Dulles. "They want to preserve their freedom and independence. However, patriotism alone is not enough. Small nations cannot easily be self-confident when they are next door to Communist China. Its almost unlimited manpower would easily dominate, and could quickly engulf the entire area were it not restrained by the mutual-security structure which has been erected. But that structure will not hold if it be words alone. Essential ingredients are the deterrent power of the U.S. and willingness to use that power in response to a military challenge. The Chinese Communists seem determined to make such a challenge."

Precision Weapons. The Communists, he continued, persistently belittle U.S. resolution, holding up the Korean truce, the Indo-China settlement and the evacuation of the Tachen Islands as evidences of U.S. weakness. "In such ways Chinese Communist propaganda portrays the U.S. as being merely a paper tiger . . . We must always remember that the free nations of the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia will quickly lose their freedom if they think that our love of peace means peace at any price. We must, if occasion offers, make it clear that we are prepared to stand firm and, if necessary, meet hostile force with the greater force that we possess."

Such force consists of U.S. sea and air power, now equipped with "new and powerful weapons of precision which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers." Any overt Chinese Communist attack probably means that the Reds "have decided on general war in Asia." In that case, the free nations would retaliate from ''the south, center and north" (i.e., from Southeast Asia, Formosa and Korea).

Long-Range Aim. Dulles' critics like to scoff at talk of retaliation and explain that bombs are no good against infiltration and subversion. In his speech Dulles acknowledged that subversion was perhaps the greatest problem of Southeast Asia today. Then, to show the relationship between military power and political progress, he cited the example of the little Indo-China kingdom of Laos, plagued by Communist-supported "disloyal elements." The government of Laos is "worried, lest, if it suppresses the Communists within, it will be struck by the Communists from without." But, he explained, if the U.S., through SEATO, promises protection from aggression, Laos can turn its full attention to putting down subversion.

Once certain of stability and protection, Asia's free nations can move toward the "political independence and economic progress and social wellbeing" promised in the Pacific Charter. "We have power that is great," said Dulles in conclusion. "We have a cause that is just. I do not doubt that we have the fortitude to use that power in defense of that just cause. If that will is manifest, then I believe that peace and freedom will prevail."

Three days later the Peking radio crackled that Dulles "was clearly preparing to invade China from the south, center and north" and "attempting to use Asians to fight Asians." Even in reverse English the broadcast proved that Red China got the point that 1) there are free Asians who intend to fight, and 2) an attack on one is an attack on all.

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