Plus & Minus in Asia

For seven days the U.S.'s fabulously traveled Secretary of State hopped from conference to conference in Asia, visiting countries ranging in sentiment from anti-Communist to neutral to scared stiff, talking to three Presidents, two Kings, a crown prince and eight foreign ministers. To all John Foster Dulles offered not only U.S. military protection against Communist attack but a constructive, long-range answer to Communism based on the development of a politically independent, economically sound Free Asia.

But at Formosa, his last stop, a shadow fell over his substantial achievement. By definition no plan for anti-Communism can ever be put in motion unless Communist aggression is halted where it is on the military march. Dulles had good reasons for refusing to state categorically whether the U.S. would or would not defend the Nationalist Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, but his refusal plunged the Nationalists into gloom and considerably dimmed the bright new hopes he had kindled in the rest of Asia.

Down the Line. Before Formosa his trip had been little short of historic. The first U.S. Secretary of State to travel in continental Asia, he began by flying from the SEATO conference in Bangkok (TIME, March 7) to neutral Burma (where Premier U Nu received him with considerably more coolness than he had shown to Red China's Chou En-lai eight months before). After a day in Burma, he traded his big Constellation for a lighter C-47, so he could land in the Indo-China kingdom of Laos. Cambodia came next day; there he listened attentively to complaints against French interference by young, popular King Norodom Sihanouk.* In the afternoon, back in his Constellation, Dulles took off for the intrigue-ridden South Viet Nam capital of Saigon to promise U.S. support to doughty little Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. From Saigon he flew to Manila for a round of diplomatic calls and a two-hour-and-ten-minute (without notes) briefing of U.S. Far Eastern ambassadors on the policy he had been preaching all along the line. Principal points:

P: SEATO's first job is to bolster the Indo-China nations of South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, and to provide them with sufficient armed forces to fight infiltration and establish order.

P: Ultimately, SEATO could become the hard core of a grand anti-Communist alliance of the Pacific, embracing all the nations linked to the U.S. by treaties and stretching from Korea's 38th parallel south to Australia and New Zealand.

P: U.S. forces will not be parceled out among Communist-menaced nations; rather, they will be poised to strike back at attacking Communist China forces on three fronts--from Korea, Formosa, and an unspecified point in Southeast Asia.

P: The anchor of strong anti-Communist policy in Asia is Japan; Japan must be helped to develop markets in Southeast Asia, becoming the source of that area's heavy machinery and other capital goods.

Lunch on the Mountain. At the last minute, on request of the Chinese Nationalists, Dulles added Formosa to his schedule. His Constellation made several passes at the field before the pilot was able to find a way down to the runway through the mist. Foreign Minister George Yeh met Dulles at planeside, escorted him to Taipei's City Hall for formal signing of the treaty that binds the U.S. to defend Formosa and the Pescadores from attack. Then Dulles was driven out to Grass Mountain, 20 minutes from Taipei, for luncheon with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang.

The lunch lasted two hours. Chiang, pointing out the difficulty of maintaining morale on Formosa in the face of retreat from the islands, asked for a specific commitment on Quemoy and the Matsus. Dulles refused; the treaty, he said, does not bind the U.S. to defend the islands. Are there any conditions under which the U.S. would defend them? asked Chiang. Possibly, replied Dulles. If President Eisenhower were to conclude that the islands are essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, then they might be defended. Chiang was bitterly disappointed and did not bother to see Dulles to the door when the luncheon was over. That evening Dulles took off through the same mist, homeward-bound, to make his report to the President and by TV to the nation.

Trouble on a Limb. Ambiguity is an ancient and necessary tool of diplomacy. In the case of Quemoy and Matsu, which are closer to the China mainland than to Formosa, it provides the U.S. with a flexibility and freedom of action, i.e., the President allows himself the chance to assess the circumstances of attack before opening fire on Communist China. Dulles has a second reason for ambiguity: in Britain, where the defense of Quemoy and Matsu is unpopular, the Churchill government has gone a long way to endorse the U.S. stand on defending Formosa, runs the risk of weakening even this stand if it is forced to endorse a definite U.S. commitment to defend Quemoy and Matsu. Thirdly, ambiguity may confuse the enemy; he cannot be certain precisely what the U.S. will do if he attacks.

But the drawback to ambiguity in U.S. pronouncements on the Far East is that Free Asians have come to read it as a forerunner of retreat. This is understandable: U.S. ambiguity about its plans in Korea was followed by stalemate and armistice, in Indo-China by retreat, and in the Tachens by evacuation. Today, even a hint of further retreat seriously demoralizes those Asian political leaders who have crawled out on a limb to support U.S. policy. For example, in the politically sensitive Philippines, President Ramon Magsaysay last month summoned all his prestige to fight through the Philippine Senate a resolution backing the U.S. stand on Formosa. Magsaysay's supporters, erroneously interpreted the U.S. position as insuring defense of Quemoy and Matsu. On this basis Magsaysay and his friends won a smashing victory. Last week, with talk of abandonment of the islands, Magsaysay's opponents missed no chance to say: "We told you so; never trust the U.S."

Inflexibility on a Line. The Communist confusion, if any, created by the Quemoy ambiguity can scarcely exceed that among U.S. officials. High U.S. officers in Taipei quietly guess that the U.S. will not defend the islands. High sources in Washington are equally certain that the U.S. will fight for them.

Secretary Dulles is entitled to a chance to use the weapon of flexibility in trying to build up a political situation of strength in Asia. His many conferences last week offered convincing evidence that the U.S. is deeply aware of the nuances of Asian politics; his announced long-range program has offered the kind of constructive anti-Communist policy that Free Asia has never had before from the U.S. But to make any kind of headway with that very program, Dulles must soon face the inflexible truth that fine talk about a fine Asian future will have no real meaning until the U.S. stops retreating in the face of Communist aggression.

* Who, two days later, astonished Dulles by abdicating his throne, see FOREIGN NEWS.

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