The Fatal Fall-Out

For months scientists and newsmen in the U.S. and around the world had been speculating about the peril of "fall-out" after atomic and hydrogen explosions.

How great was the danger from the radioactive dust that descends upon the earth after the big blasts? Last week, to set the record straight and to counteract some exaggerations, the Atomic Energy Commission issued a special report. Even without exaggeration the story was fantastic.

Cigar-Shaped Peril. In the Pacific last March, the hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll sent a shower of deadly radioactive dust (mostly pulverized coral) over a vast cigar-shaped area extending 220 miles downwind from the blast. Along a strip up to 20 miles wide, extending 140 miles downwind, the fall-out--if it had come down in a populated area--would have seriously threatened the lives of nearly every human. At a distance of 160 miles the lives of half the people would be threatened; at 190 miles 5% to 10% might die (varying with individual reaction to radioactivity). The fallout was deadly enough to kill in an area of 7,000 square miles.

Localized to an industrial area of the U.S., the AEC's estimates would mean that a Bikini-sized H-bomb dropped on Cleveland with the wind northwest could level the city, threaten the life of everyone in Pittsburgh, and spread lethal ash across a strip of West Virginia, into Virginia and Maryland (see map). If the wind were stronger than it was at the time of the Bikini test, the fatal fallout from a Cleveland bomb could reach all the way to Washington.

The AEC's computations are based on the worst possible conditions, i.e., they assume that no one would take protective measures. Paradoxically, old and simple steps are highly effective against the new and horrible peril. Taking shelter in an old-fashioned Kansas cyclone cellar with a 3-ft. ceiling of earth until the fallout is over will reduce the immediate radiation absorbed by a human being to a safe level, even in the worst fallout area.

But there could be long-range effects harder to guard against. One substance found in nuclear fallout is strontium-go, which, when taken into the body in dangerous amounts, causes deterioration of the bones. Its effects could reach people years after the blast, if it fell on soil where food later was grown for animals used for milk or meat.

Weather-Plagued Test. Washington's report on fallout was prompted by two main considerations. President Eisenhower and the AEC wanted to re-emphasize the need for 1) civil defense in the U.S., and 2) a continued campaign for realistic international control of atomic weapons.

At the atomic testing grounds on the Nevada desert last week, fallout was a key consideration. For four days in a row, the AEC postponed the scheduled first shot in a new series of tests--the explosion of an "atomic device" atop a 500-ft. tower. On the first scheduled test day, weather calculations showed that the radioactive cloud from a dawn explosion would be passing over the town of Caliente, Nev. (pop. 1,000), about 50 miles away, at about the time schoolchildren were standing on the street corners waiting for buses. For the next three days, there were similar problems. Actually, the AEC did not think that the tests would produce dangerous fallout, but they had to think of public reaction. Said one atomic expert: "We're interested in minimizing the fear of hazards as much as the hazards themselves." At week's end the Nevada test managers finally decided to start the series with what had been scheduled as the second step: the drop of a "baby" atom bomb (equivalent to 5,000 to 15,000 tons of TNT) from an airplane. Since the bomb would explode in midair, it would be less likely to siphon up particles from the ground and therefore would produce a less dangerous fallout. The clouds from nuclear explosions that do not suck up particles from the earth travel long distances (sometimes around the world) and descend in such minute particles that they are seldom dangerous.

The report on the perils of fallout and the new tests on the Nevada desert last week sharply illustrated the key points of U.S. atomic weapon policy. The U.S.

realizes the consequences of atomic and hydrogen war, but until there is sensible and secure international control, it intends to go on improving nuclear weapons and trying to establish defenses against them.

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