When & How

In the years between world wars, when British influence was predominant in the Middle East, British policy was to keep the Arabs disunited and exploitable. At the end of World War I, the British Foreign Office deliberately carved the Arab Middle East into artificial chunks, maneuverable as so many chessmen. Near the end of World War II, when the xenophobic Arabs began dreaming of union, the Foreign Office forestalled it by inventing the Arab League, a loose forum in which Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen systematically demonstrated that they had a common religion and a common culture but little common ground.

Last week, with the West now trying to make them realize a common need&#defense against Communism--the Arab League states broke into a noisy quarrel. The uproar was provoked by Iraq's decision to join a defense alliance with NATO member Turkey. Iraq's pact collided with the league's strictures against members joining in outside alliance. More to the point, it meant that Iraq, second strongest of the Arab nations, was openly challenging Egypt's position as the presumed leader of the Arab world.

Two Sides. Convened in angry haste by Egypt's Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser, the league's leaders gathered in Cairo. Iraq argued that the Arabs could not safely refuse to seek the protection of the West. As ex-Premier Mohammed Fadhil Jamali once put it: "We have many complaints against the West...But this should not blind us to the fact that the West today needs us as much as we need the West...The Arabs do not have the force to stand against international currents and have no alternative but to depend on others for their own defense." Egypt argued that Arabs should unite and grow strong on their own before joining in Western defense, thereby assuring themselves more influence. Said Nasser: "Our people are still suffering from the complex of foreign domination. Any organization coming from without would be looked upon with suspicion and mistrust."

Off to Baghdad. In nine days of table-pounding debate, Nasser fought to make the Iraqis back down from their commitment to Turkey. When Iraq refused to budge, the angry Premier demanded that the other league members join him in reading Iraq out of the league's collective security arrangements. Most of the others shared Egypt's irritation but demurred at going so far. Instead, they persuaded Nasser to adjourn the session while a planeload of Arab League representatives flew off to Baghdad to try to argue Iraq's Premier Nuri es-Said back into the fold.

The fiction of Arab League unity was coming to an end. But the quarrel has its encouraging side: so long mistrustful of the West and tending to neutralism, the Arabs are debating not whether to throw in with the West, but when and how.

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