Clash of Opinion

R.M.S. Queen Elizabeth (83,673 tons) completed the 3,007 nautical miles from Ambrose Light to Bishop Rock at an average 29.73 knots--her fastest eastbound crossing since the war. The Queen's No. I passenger, Sir Winston Churchill, expressed himself content with the passage, and manfully concealed his disappointment in the outcome of his talks with President Eisenhower. "We have not entirely failed," said he upon landing, pink-faced and zesty, at Southampton.

"Nothing comes before the true and lasting friendship between Britain and the United States." But once back home in Whitehall, the great man began presiding over a series of Cabinet meetings that might determine a new course for Britain. The possible course: eastbound, away from the U.S., in convoy with the French and other like-minded allies.

Behind Whitehall's traditional fac,cade of Cabinet unity, there were hints of tumult and clash. Sometimes it was handsome Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (b. 1897; educ. Eton and Oxford) versus the tough-minded Marquess of Salisbury, Lord President of the Council (b. 1893; educ. Eton and Oxford); sometimes it was Eden versus Churchill, who was a Cabinet minister before Eden was twelve.

This much was known: Indo-China. Eden now felt sure that the Communists would settle for peace in Indo-China. He was more worried by the U.S.: that the U.S. might not guarantee the settlement, and that the Communists might therefore balk. Eden would not concede that he was dissociating from the U.S., believed that the U.S.

would some day pat him on the back for everything he had done.

Malenkov. Eden believed that Churchill's desire for a Malenkov meeting might unnecessarily offend Washington. Eden is historically sensitive to Prime Ministers (like Chamberlain in the late '30s) who develop foreign policies over Anthony Eden's head. The dispute was sharp and important: Eden was already getting advice from several of his friends to resign if Churchill went ahead on his own.

Red China. The Cabinet was badly split on this question: How should Britain vote when admission of Red China to the U.N. came up at the General Assembly this fall? Salisbury was against it; so, at this time, was Churchill; Eden had not made up his mind, but he did not see why Britain should vote against Red China if the Communists settled for peace in Southeast Asia. Eden knew that a British vote for Red China--even an abstention--would cause real trouble with the U.S., but once more he seemed blandly confident that the U.S. would some day appreciate his contributions.

In the willingness to hope for and believe in a negotiated coexistence with the Communists, most Britons appeared to be standing behind Churchill and Eden.

But there" was a proud and powerful minority who did not like Geneva. Lord Beaverbrook's Daily Express (circ. 4,000,000) is not the most influential voice in Britain, but it is certainly the loudest.

The Express allowed that Red China in the U.N. would be "folly ... an immense reinforcement to the forces of disaster." Lord Alexander, Churchill's Minister of Defense and one of Britain's top-ranking World War II soldiers, warned recently that Communism's expansive ambitions have not changed, that Britain must do her utmost "to maintain the integrity of Southeast Asia." If free nations do not play the part forced upon them, Alexander said, "Western Christian civilization as we know it will be submerged and disappear." Such weeklies as the Economist and Punch had misgivings about Geneva; the Spectator referred to Geneva as "something repellent." And Tory Lord Vansit-tart, one of the first influential British politicians to warn against Hitler in the '30s, was now striving to awaken Britain to the realities of Mao's Red China.

"Long ago," said he last week, "I defined treaties with totalitarians as a system under which the faithful are always bound, and the faithless always free."

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