Monday, Jul. 05, 1954
Risks of a Municheer
Only 24 hours before departure for Washington, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden seemed more anxious to emphasize the divergences in U.S.-British policies than the agreements. So did the House of Commons. After listening to the debate on his Geneva policies, Eden rose again and summarized his mandate from the House, as he saw it: "Do all you can to have the best possible relations with the United States, but do not forget what the House of Commons wants you to do."
What the House wanted Eden to do was to give the Communists the benefit of every doubt. Where no doubt existed, it wanted doubt created so that benefit might be given. Living under the fear of destruction by hydrogen bombs in case of any war, Britons seemed more interested in Communist bargains, however bad, that might bring peace than allied action, however wise, that brought a risk of war.
Sorest Point. Listening to his speech, political pundits concluded that Eden had decided the Bevan brand of anti-Americanism had become politically popular. He went out of his way to pay "my personal tribute" to Molotov, welcomed the "opportunity to meet Chou En-lai," praised France's Bidault and Mendes-France, and even had a word of praise for the U.S.'s Bedell Smith. But he pointedly had no word for Secretary of State Dulles. He pressed hard on the sorest point in the touchy U.S.-British relationship: the recognition of Red China. "There is no doubt that one result of the conference has been an improvement in Anglo-Chinese relations ... a real contribution to peaceful coexistence," he said, and from the House cheers rose. He complained pointedly that the "absence of normal diplomatic relations between a number of countries [was] quite unique in my experience, and I devoutly trust will never be repeated. Someone [at Geneva] had to provide a channel of communication, even at the risk of being called a 'Municheer.' "
He reiterated British insistence that any Western plans for Asia must wait on India's Nehru, then launched a new proposal for an international guarantee for any Indo-Chinese settlement, "a reciprocal arrangement in which both sides take part, such as Locarno [see box]." Said Eden:
"Suppose that everybody agreed that Laos and Cambodia should lead their own lives, and that whatever other arrangements were agreed to about Viet Nam should be guaranteed; suppose an Asian circle, consisting on the one hand of China and Soviet Russia and, on the other, of France, America and ourselves --and perhaps India and other countries, too--could guarantee the arrangements arrived at ... Surely it is something worth while trying to get." As for a Southeast Asia defensive alliance, Eden deprecated the U.S.'s urgency by remarking that the idea was "really not a new one ... Its relevance to current events must not be exaggerated. It could be a future safeguard, but it is not a present panacea." "There Is a Danger." All through his speech, the noisiest approval came from the Socialists. Herbert Morrison, Foreign Secretary in the last Labor government, said that Eden "has taken much the line that we should have taken had we been in office." Tory and Socialist alike, speaker after speaker rose to congratulate Eden on his speech and his Geneva mission, to deplore the U.S. refusal to recognize Communist China, to urge the government to continue its independence of U.S. policy. Sir Robert Boothby, the Tories' TV glamour boy, passed his judgment on Eden at Geneva: "I know of no comparable diplomatic achievement during the past 25 years." Opposition Leader Clement Attlee declared that the "most notable" thing about Geneva was the European debut of the "real rulers" of China, and the "most important" thing the "contact" established with the Chinese government.
The U.S.'s refusal to recognize China, said Attlee, is the "real obstacle" to peace in Korea. "One hears about Chinese imperialism. There is a danger. There is always a danger that a flushed nationalism may turn to imperialism. We saw recently that they [the Chinese] have 603 million people to look after. Surely that is enough for any government."
"Britain has a decisive role to play," cried Socialist Woodrow Wyatt. "That role is to civilize the power of America . . . Today, Britain is the respected free nation in Southeast Asia, and I am afraid America is the discredited nation."
Head Winds. Almost the lone voice of dissent came from a surprising source: John Eden, 28-year-old nephew of Anthony himself, who rose timidly to make his maiden speech. Said nephew John: "I do not believe that the Communist powers of either Russia or China have shown a very great or genuine change of heart . . . One by one, the innocent countries are being eaten up by the Soviet walrus and the Chinese carpenter. We must stop this feast before there is nothing left." Only powerful, determined and united opposition, said John Eden, will make them change their plans. "We should have a complete change of outlook among the people of our country."
Uncle Anthony, in a graceful little speech in comment, was indulgent with nephew John's maiden effort, but added banteringly: "At the same time, I cannot tell him that I enjoyed his speech." Analyzing the House's debate, Anthony Eden declared--accurately--that it "has not really been a debate at all but an expression of a national feeling." Outside the House of Commons, only a few voices were raised to dispute that national feeling. Snapped the Daily Express: "Whatever gains may have been made in moving closer towards China have been more than compensated by damage to friendship with America." The Economist noted "a most dangerous atmosphere of complacency." Next evening, ignoring such rare voices in their new forest of appeasement, Eden and Sir Winston Churchill boarded a Stratocruiser chartered from BOAC. They took off into stiff head winds, blowing hard from the direction of Washington.
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