The Shape of a Surrender
France's new Premier Pierre Mendes-France, who is also his own Foreign Minister, arrived on the overnight express in Bern, Switzerland last week, showing the effects of his first crowded days in office.
He looked weary, his herringbone suit was rumpled, his blue-black beard was sprouting. His first visitor at Bern's imposing French embassy was a Swiss barber, who came calling on a bicycle.
Premier Mendes-France had gone to Berne to seek terms of peace in Indo-China from Red China's Chou En-lai--a move which the U.S., having virtually withdrawn from the Geneva conference, watched with well-founded anxiety. Mendes had at first intended to go to Geneva for his talk with Chou, but was dissuaded by Britain's Eden on grounds of protocol (Mendes would have been the only Western Prime Minister there). So the meeting was arranged at Bern instead.
Mendes was working against time: if he could not arrange peace by July 20, he had promised to step down as Premier. U.S. observers thought this deadline subjected Mendes to unnecessary pressure, that the Communists might take advantage by raising their price. Actually, the pressure might work both ways. The Reds should know that although Mendes has refused total capitulation, they probably can get no better peace terms from any Frenchman who might succeed him.
Chou En-lai & Co. were glad to see Pierre Mendes-France. Both men smiled as they shook hands at the door of the French embassy in Berne. Mendes proposed that, since the weather was nice, they sit out on the flagstone terrace.
Orange juice was served. The talk lasted more than two hours, and in those two hours skilled Diplomat Chou exerted his famed charm. Mendes came away talking about how much he was impressed with Chou's personality and "sincerity." Chou appeared equally pleased with Mendes.
Leaving the embassy, one member of the Chinese party skipped with delight.
The shape of impending peace terms:
1) France would give to the Viet Minh all of Viet Nam north of the 16th parallel --that is, not only Hanoi and Haiphong and the Red River Delta, but all of the Annamese coast around the Gulf of Tonkin. As a concession to French pride, the French would get up to six months to get out of Hanoi and Haiphong.
2) Laos and Cambodia would be "neutralized" and "independent." Both French and Communist troops would withdraw.
In effect, this meant that French troops would withdraw; nobody would be able to do much about Communists disguised as volunteer "free" Laotians.
3) Elections would be held in Viet Nam in 18 months. (The Communists expected to win, and Mendes privately conceded they would, in which case they would also get Saigon and the rest of Viet Nam below the 16th parallel.)
4) As a further sop to French pride, her "cultural" interests in the Associated States would be preserved and French economic interests could be "negotiated." In practice, this meant that some Frenchmen might stay in Viet Nam if the Communists were willing to let them stay. Chou added magnanimously that he would have no objection to future schooling of Vietnamese administrators in France, or young officers at St. Cyr, to satisfy Mendes' insistence on "the permanency of French presence." Chou told Mendes a little story. At a dinner at Geneva recently with representatives of Viet Minh, Laos and Cambodia, "I said to them. 'When all three of you get together to eat rice you all use chopsticks, but when you get together to talk you all three speak French.' "Chou smiled broadly at Mendes. "Let us regard that as a good analogy." Peace, if it came to pass on these terms, would be a thinly disguised capitulation by the French. Washington did not like it, but was resignedly prepared to accept it.
Mendes and Chou agreed to meet again, at Geneva, some time around July 12 to work out the details. At this point, Chou at least could afford to smile.
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