Alone

We are fighting by ourselves alone; but we are not fighting for ourselves alone.

--Winston Churchill, July 14, 1940 The U.S. has no firmer ally than Britain and no firmer friends in Britain than Sir Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden.

But the alliance and the friendship now appear in an entirely different light.

Throughout the Geneva Conference Eden had been busily courting the Communists.

Last week, 48 hours before he and Churchill took off for the Washington Conference, Eden in the House of Commons (see FOREIGN NEWS) struck at the heart of U.S. policy in Asia by proposing a "Locarno pact." A key provision: defense against further Communist advance in Asia would rest upon a Communist promise not to advance. This speech, flung in the teeth of President Eisenhower's statement that what he wanted from the Reds was "deeds, not words," advertised--deliberately or otherwise--a basic split between Britain and the U.S.

As one man, Britain's leaders from left to right voiced approval of Eden's speech.

There is no doubt whatever that the British public and press agreed with Anthony Eden's specific points, or that they welcomed the opportunity to tell the world--especially the Russians--that Britain was disassociating itself from the U.S. on so fundamental a question as whether the Communists could be trusted.

This British attitude is not new. It was concealed by the traditional British stiff upper lip and by such bold flashes as Churchill's Fulton speech of 1946 and Ernest Bevin's stand against the Russians at the 1947 London Conference. But underneath, the British know that in a military sense their position is indefensible.

Since 1945 the atomic bomb has hung over their heads. Thermonuclear bombs intensify a fear that never leaves any British subject for long. Airmen agree that eight or ten H-bombs, dropped on a well-planned pattern, would bring utter destruction.

Accordingly, the British are determined not to get into a thermonuclear war. The peril to Britain is no illusion. They would indeed be superhuman if they were not afraid. But however understandable the British attitude may be, the fact revealed by the Eden speech is: the U.S. has no strong, reliable ally.

Will Britain Stand Aside? Looking back, it is easy to see that the U.S., having failed to overcome its allies' reservations to a strong coalition policy, has become more and more isolated in the last few years. Before France began to capitulate to Red pressure this year, there were plenty of signs that France would do just that. In Britain, the signs were almost as plain.

Again and again, British leaders have had to assure their people that Britain keeps its freedom of decision, that the U.S. cannot commit Britain to war. Again and again, British writers have pointed out that there is no formal bilateral alliance between Britain and the U.S. that would bind Britain to stand at the U.S.'s side in combat. Now it is clear that these statements meant exactly what they said and are not merely fine words to comfort the timid.

On both sides of the Atlantic it has been fashionable to ignore the British fears and reservations, to say that the ties that bind the U.S. and Britain are stronger than any formal alliance. In one sense, this is profoundly true. But in another sense, these references to the traditional union of the two nations ignore military realities.

Eden's speech and the recent course of British policy make no sense if, as has been assumed. Britain must inevitably stand with the U.S. at the showdown. The British position only makes sense if Britain is indeed free to adopt the course of neutrality in a war between Russia and the U.S.

Possibly, if the chips were down, the British mood would swiftly change again, as it changed between Munich and Poland. Possibly, Britain would be neutral at the start, coming in later, after the Russian atomic striking power had been wiped out. Or possibly it would--with that splendid British back-to-the-wall courage--come in only if the U.S. seemed about to lose the war. Or Britain might not come in at all.

In the light of these real possibilities, little nubbins of agreement at conferences in Bermuda and Berlin and Washington must no longer obscure the central fact that for practical purposes the U.S. stands alone among the great powers in the cold war. After what has recently happened, the bluff of Anglo-American solidarity can hardly fool Moscow. It would be tragic if it continued to delude Washington.

The weekend conference at Washington ended with the usual superficial communiques, which strove to conceal the basic split. Nothing that happened in the White House changes the fact that Britain more and more wants it known that it will not necessarily back the U.S. in any determined effort to win the struggle with world Communism.

No good will come of blaming Britain for this. The U.S. was not betrayed. Most unperfidiously, Albion has said repeatedly that he was not to be counted upon.

Instead of recrimination, the U.S. needs to rethink its foreign policy in the light of its newly revealed isolation. The belief that the U.S. must and could depend on the coalition led to wholesale concessions to all concerned; this, in turn, brought on a descending spiral of resolution. The U.S. could not make a move without consulting Britain, and Britain could not move in Europe without consulting France, or in Asia without consulting Nehru. Since France was irresponsible, and Nehru worse, U.S. policy descended, in effect, toward the lowest common denominator of decision.

The Lost Weekends. The U.S. has been in this dizzy spiral so long that it hardly has a coherent policy to set up against the neutralism and wish-thinking of the British. To get in motion a policy strong enough to stop the drift toward World War III, the U.S. needs to stop these futile weekends of illusory agreement. Instead of cajoling allies who are too preoccupied with peril to listen, the U.S., on the basis of its own strength, can raise a clearly legible standard in the expectation of victory. Such a new approach might draw together a firmer alliance than the present coalition of huddled fear.

Britain in 1940 proved what could be done for civilization by one nation standing resolutely alone. The result then was a grand alliance that worked; but before the alliance could exist, there had to be a clear purpose.

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