Bitter Facts

"Why all the fuss?" asked France's Georges Bidault wearily, as he entrained from Geneva to face a hostile assembly in Paris. "When the game is over, why not merely say so?"

The man who blew the whistle was Russia's Molotov. Ever since he returned from Moscow ten days before, he had dropped his role of forbearing arbiter and become once again the familiar aggressive antagonist. Observers suspected that he had learned in Moscow the only thing he wanted to know: the U.S. was not going to intervene in Indo-China. Last week Molotov got confirmation from the highest sources. Secretary of State Dulles said that the U.S. "has no intention of dealing with the Indo-China situation unilaterally"; that it was up to the French, and that there were no plans for asking Congress to act. President Eisenhower, who had once called Indo-China the cork in the bottle, said that without the proper psychological and political foundation, there was no sense in merely using up resources in some local battle. If uncertainty over U.S. intentions had been the only deterrent to Communist Hemands, it was a deterrent no longer.

In a plenary session called at his request, Molotov bided his time while Bi dault argued, with an eye on Paris, that the conference had achieved "some appreciable results," notably its acceptance of the French plea to discuss a military cease-fire before going into the interminable difficulties of a political settlement. Then Molotov spoke.

He was abusive, arrogant, mocking. Clearly intending to bring down the La-niel government, he complained of Bi-dault's "refusal or evasion of negotiations" with the Viet Minh itself, taunted him with the cost to France in men and money of a "colonial war." He charged that the Bao Dai government had no popular support. He claimed that the Communists already controlled three-quarters of Viet Nam, half of Laos, a smaller but increasing part of Cambodia. As for Dienbienphu, "Who can deny that the defense of Dienbienphu was in the main carried out not by the French and the Vietnamese but by all kinds of foreigners gathered there?"

Then Molotov deliberately demolished all Bidault's hopes for a quick ceasefire. The conference must "examine without further delay the political questions," said Molotov blandly. These should include, "first of all," the "granting of sovereignty" to all three Indo-Chinese states, the holding of "free elections" in each, and the withdrawal of all "foreign" troops. Political discussion, he said, should be parallel with the military, and should be conducted by "direct contact between the representatives of both sides"--an arrangement that would force recognition of the bogus and largely nonexistent "liberation" movements of both Laos and Cambodia.

Angrily, Bidault snapped that Molotov's remarks were "not couched in decent fashion." Retorted Molotov: "I don't think anyone can attack facts, even though they are bitter facts." Dead Hopes. The bitter facts were that Molotov had killed all hope that the Communists would settle for a cease-fire or a partition of Viet Nam alone. Molotov was demanding all of Indo-China--and on the Communists' own terms. Next day China's Chou En-lai echoed Molotov's every word, rejected the West's plea for an impartial commission of Southeast Asia neutrals, insisted, like Molotov, on settling political issues before a truce was signed. Bedell Smith flung in his face one of Chou's own dictums, spoken in 1945: "Truce is the military counterpart of the political tactic of coalition government. It is a means to an end, not the ultimate objective." After two days of Communist arrogance, even the doggedly hopeful Anthony Eden was disillusioned--at long last. "We have exhausted every expedient of procedure which we could devise," he admitted sadly.

"But if the positions remain as they are today, then it is our clear duty to say so to the world and to admit that we have failed. I say this with infinite regret, but it is our stern duty to face realities." In London the Foreign Office hinted that now Britain would be willing to press ahead with plans for a Southeast Asia pact.

Breaking Off. At week's end the fall of the French government paralyzed all negotiations. But the Communists made clear that they were anxious to keep on talking, if only to blame the West for the impending break. They had their bait ready in military maps. Though political talks were deadlocked, the Communists might tempt a new French government to keep talking by yielding an acre here, a salient there, on the tried & true pattern of Panmunjom.

But what could the West save at Geneva? Laniel had publicly declared that France could not fight on without help.

The U.S. had said publicly that it would not give that help. That left the conference with nothing to do but legalize the Communist conquest of Indo-China.

The only question seemed to be: Would it be better to watch a French delegate do the legalizing, or, by breaking off, pretend that no one was looking while Indo-China slowly slipped away, either in a maproom or paddy by paddy?

-- But perhaps not entirely. As a result of private negotiations with the Chinese delegation, the British won one concession: four years after Britain recognized Red China, Peking consented to recognize Britain, secretly agreed to send a charge d'affaires to the Court of St. James's some time soon.

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