Monday, May. 31, 1954

The Penalty for Stalling

In Geneva last week, time was running out for the West. The Communists stalled. They could afford to.

For four days they faced the delegates of the Free Nations in secret sessions on Indo-China. The Communists' principal line repeated daily was that any settlement must be applied to all three Indo-Chinese states. The West retorted that Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia must be discussed separately.

Recognized Phantoms. When the West broke off in disgust for "a day of grace," the Communists baited the trap a little: Molotov agreed that three separate armistice commissions could be formed. This meant that France would have to accord tacit recognition to the phantom Communist regimes of Laos and Cambodia as members of the armistice commissions, but the hungry French called it progress. The U.S. diagnosis:"This session got nowhere."

But Communist stalling, by its very obviousness, was beginning to defeat itself. For one thing, it allowed France's doughty Foreign Minister Georges Bidault to resist arrogant Communist demands without repudiation from Paris. Likewise, stalling--plus the military threat to the Red River Delta (see below}--gave urgency to Bidault's insistent demands for help from the U.S. Warned Roger Seydoux, France's No. 2 diplomat in the U.S.: "France will not continue to be the foot soldier of the free world In Southeast Asia. The free nations will have to join the fight, not only with planes and ships, but also with troops." The U.S. replied with preliminary, tentative conditions: France must give Viet Nam complete independence, agree to step up its own military effort, accept an allied command.

Recognized Hazards. Most important, the Communists' stalling had at last raised some doubts in British minds. At week's end Foreign Secretary Eden sought out Chou En-lai and warned him that if he presses his demands too far, the U.S. might be provoked to immediate action. Chou, thinking he saw an opportunity to exploit allied differences, replied slyly that he counted on the British to restrain the U.S. Eden was shocked into firmness. There should be no mistake, he said. If a showdown came in Indo-China, Britain would fight at the U.S.'s side.

Eden flew back to London for a weekend conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Churchill's top advisers, then returned to Geneva with instructions to make it clear to the Communists that Britain's patience was nearing an end. Already the British had agreed to join in military staff talks in Washington. Unless Geneva produced results within a week or two, Eden indicated, Britain might stop listening and join the U.S. in shaping a Southeast Asian alliance.

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