Insistent Visitor

A silver Constellation dropped down on London Airport one morning last week, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles alighted from it. Like a stone in a pool, his arrival sent ripples of alarm coursing through Britain and France. Warmed by the spring sun, many British and French had somehow fallen into a hazy, hopeful dream that everything could be settled at Geneva if only nothing was done to alarm the shy Communists. To them, Dulles, with his call for "united action" before Geneva and a joint warning to Communist China, came as an insistent intruder. The jittery press talked of "ultimatum," conjured visions of H-bombs dropped on Peking unless the Chinese Communists withdrew their aid to Ho Chi Minh.

But Dulles knew what he was doing. He encountered adamant British opposition to his proposed warning as "prejudicial" to the Geneva Conference, and dropped it without a fight. But it had served its purpose: to make everybody aware that Indo-China is a crucial battlefield for all free nations and that the U.S. so regards it.

Acknowledgement of the common peril was more important to Dulles than the details of what would be done about it. The problem was to find the words that others might sign. The formula finally drawn was somewhat less specific than Dulles would have liked, but it was as much as Eden felt he could defend before British opinion.

Well-Chosen Words. After three meetings with Eden (and dinner with Churchill), Dulles got agreement to a statement declaring Britain's recognition that Communist aggression in Indo-China "endangers" the security of the whole Southeast Asia area, and "accordingly, we are ready to take part with other countries principally concerned in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense . . ." The ten suggested countries were the U.S., France, Britain, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the three Indo-Chinese states.

The words were well chosen. The first British reaction was relief that Dulles' joint warning had been averted. In the House of Commons, Eden himself discreetly pointed out that he had avoided "some fulminating declaration." The Economist congratulated him on this "very adroit piece of evasive action." To the U.S. delegation, however, the declaration meant that Britain has in effect agreed to 1) the idea of a Pacific "NATO." 2) some kind of collective military action against China as a possibility if Geneva fails, 3) steps to be taken at once to set up the Pacific alliance as a warning to the Communists at the tables in Geneva. If it meant the same to the British, Eden found it wise not to say so. Even as Dulles flew to Paris. Eden was mollifying questioners. "What I am committed to." he said, "is an examination. The House will understand that we could not possibly have gone further."

No Hurry. Next day, Dulles called at the Quai d'Orsay, spent half an hour with Bidault in his private office, prodding him to action on EDC (see below), then went upstairs to the tapestry-hung Salon de Beauvais, where the Indo-Chinese experts were waiting. Dulles went directly to the central problem: France's long-standing resistance to "internationalizing" the Indo-Chinese war. its eagerness to control all the talking at Geneva.

Even before he arrived, his campaign had made progress; French diplomats had let it be known that they would allow other forces--e.g., U.S. planes, naval forces--into the fight if Geneva failed. Around the big table, Dulles quickly won a formal admission that the Communist onslaught in Indo-China "also threatens the entire area of Southeast Asia and of the Western Pacific," and an agreement to "examine the possibility of establishing ... a collective defense." Like the British, the French were not anxious to push such "examination" before Geneva.

Problems Ahead. If Dulles envisioned a formal "SEATO" or "PATO." the alliance was a long way from reality. Only Thailand, who feels it is next on the Communist list if Indo-China falls, rushed to declare its unconditional support; others, like the Philippines, agreed--with stipulations. Britain, irked at being excluded from the present Anzus pact with the U.S., would welcome the chance to reestablish itself as a partner in Pacific defense with Australia and New Zealand. But if the pact were widened to include Japan, Formosa, or South Korea, problems would arise. Britain would want no alliance with Chiang Kaishek; Syngman Rhee would balk at joining with Japan. So would the Philippines.

But Dulles' concept was apparently simpler: a loose arrangement which would provide 1) a demonstration of united strength that might make the Chinese Communists pause, and 2) a legal basis for direct U.S. participation if the Chinese aid to Indo-China is stepped up.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.