Whatever Is Necessary

With some nervousness the U.S. approached next week's opening of the Geneva Conference with the Communists on the Far East. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, on a quick trip to Europe, had made progress in the essential matter of reaching agreement with Britain and France on the basic position of the three Western powers (see FOREIGN NEWS). But the trip left him no time to brief Congress, which felt that the U.S. position on the Far East was unclear. Capitol Hill wanted more information. The uneasiness was intensified by the course of the war in Indo-China. If the French position continued to get worse, what was the U.S. going to do about it?

No Further Retreat. With the President vacationing in Georgia and Dulles resting on an island in Lake Ontario, Vice President Richard Nixon stepped up at a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington's Statler Hotel to explain the U.S. attitude. In his formal speech, Nixon said: "There is no reason why French forces should not remain in Indo-China and win. They have greater manpower and a tremendous advantage over their adversaries, particularly in air power." The great "problem," however, is one of "spirit." Heart and will to win are essential; French and Vietnamese forces must be given encouragement to fight and resist.

"France," said Nixon, "is tired of the war, as we were tired of Korea . . . Some say that if the French get out, the Vietnamese will fight with more spirit because they would be fighting for their independence. But the Vietnamese lack the ability to conduct a war by themselves or to govern themselves. If the French withdraw, Indo-China will become Communist-dominated within a month."

An editor promptly asked a key question: What will the U.S. do if the French withdraw? Replied Nixon: The U.S. as a leader of the free world cannot afford further retreat in Asia. It is hoped that the U.S. can avoid direct involvement in Indo-China. But if there is no other recourse, the Administration will have to face up to the situation and send troops.

This statement made headlines, partly because of confusion about whether or not the statement could be regarded as an official expression of policy (see PRESS). Actually, it was a restatement of what has long been implicit in the policy of the Eisenhower Administration.

No Proclaimed Exclusions. After Dean Acheson, in a speech to Washington's National Press Club in January 1950, excluded Korea from the area that the U.S. intended to defend, the Communists attacked there. That hard lesson taught the U.S. how dangerous it was to exclude any part of the free world from a publicly proclaimed defense perimeter. The Eisenhower policy is to be very cautious with commitments about where the U.S. will send troops--and much more cautious about commitments of where it will not send troops.

Nixon's sense-making answer was supplemented this week by Dulles' statement that he considered it unlikely that U.S. troops would actually have to be sent to Indo-China.

For Geneva, and for a basic understanding of U.S. policy, the nub of Nixon's speech was that the U.S. and the free world could not afford any more losses to Communism in Asia, and that the U.S.

intended to do whatever was necessary to stop any other Communist advance.

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