The Big Sag

For the first time since the Eisenhower Administration came into office, there was a serious sag in the struggle to strengthen the free world against Communism. Not a soldier or a bomber was subtracted last week from military plans; no territory changed hands. The big sag was a state of mind, and it came because the world was hanging loosely between the two international conferences -the U.S. -British-French-Russian conference just ended at Berlin, and the Big Four conference with Communist China at Geneva, late next month.

In London and Paris, the advocates of a European Army (EDC) thought that the Berlin meeting had proved beyond doubt that EDC was the only answer to Russian intransigence. They soon discovered, instead, that the advocates of stall and delay were in a stronger position than ever, because Geneva promised still another chance of negotiated settlement. In the U.S., the big sag took the shape of fear over what might happen at Geneva.

Unexpected Criticism. To the chagrin of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Senate Majority Leader Bill Knowland told the New York County Republican Committee: "The American people will not consent to a Far Eastern Munich." Dulles, as he made his rounds of Capitol Hill, was sharply questioned in both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

At midweek he went before the television cameras to report to the nation. Said he: "I find on my return that there is some confusion as to what really happened ... As far as Europe was concerned, we brought Mr. Molotov to show Russia's hand. It was seen as a hand that held fast to everything it had . . . and also it sought to grab some more." As far as Asia was concerned, there would be no U.S. recognition of Communist China at Geneva, Dulles went on. "I can think of some Soviet benefits that we would not like, and should prevent. But I do not wholly exclude the idea that the Soviet Union might in fact want peace in Asia."

Vote by Easter. Dulles' self-assurance -and Washington's preoccupation with Joe McCarthy -calmed the domestic argument. But the State Department itself was getting uneasy over what was happening to EDC in France. Dulles thought that French Foreign Minister Bidault had promised at Berlin that EDC would be pushed through the National Assembly before Geneva began -in fact, this was one reason why Dulles agreed to discuss Indo-China at Geneva. Last week, as Paris stalled on EDC, Dulles radioed a sharp reminder to Bidault that a vote on EDC by Easter was "essential."

In Asia the sag was showing even more seriously. French civilians in Indo-China and at home were yearning for an "honorable settlement" with the Chinese Reds, and indicating that they had abandoned the idea of victory, regardless of Geneva's outcome. India's Nehru glibly proposed an immediate cease-fire in Indo-China, knowing that the nature of Communist infiltration into Indo-China's vital areas would give the Reds an easy victory in the event of a ceasefire.

Nehru topped off the week by bitterly rejecting President Eisenhower's personal offer of military aid to India, to counter balance U.S. aid for neighboring Pakistan. Then, in the same speech to the Indian Parliament, he demanded that U.S. members of the United Nations cease-fire mission in Kashmir be called home because the U.S. was providing aid to Pakistan.

Greatest Disappointment. It was Sir Winston Churchill who furnished the week's worst news. Churchill had clamored loudest for a conference to test Russian intentions, and now declined to recognize the findings of Berlin. In a speech to the House of Commons (see FOREIGN NEWS), Churchill urged a twin-pronged policy of defense and continued negotiations, and drew heaviest applause from the growing bloc of Laborites who oppose EDC. "The net effect of his speech," reported a TIME correspondent, "was to encourage all those who can think of reasons for not taking a definitive and courageous decision in favor of arming West Germany."

While signs multiplied that the anti-Communist alliance was under heavy strain, the U.S. public was hardly aware of the danger. Thanks to Joe McCarthy, it was concentrating on the case of a New York dentist named Irving Peress. The Big Sag was caused in part by the Big Wind from Wisconsin.

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